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INTRODUCTION
In its landmark decision Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme
Court held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is
required to consider costs before deciding to regulate the hazardous air pollutant emissions of power plants through its Mercury
and Air Toxics Standards,1 which were promulgated during the
Obama Administration.2 The Court, however, did not decide how
benefits should be taken into account, and identified, but left
open, a significant question: how to address the benefits from
reductions in particulate matter beyond the levels already required under the Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS).3 Reductions of hazardous air pollutant
emissions are the direct benefits of the Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards, whereas particulate reductions are the indirect benefits, also referred to as co-benefits or ancillary benefits,4 which
result from the actions that power plants are expected to take in
order to comply with these standards.5
Courts may soon have the opportunity to address the question of how to treat particulate matter co-benefits as a result of
President Trump’s efforts to undo the most significant environmental regulations of the Obama Administration. In particular,
a top priority of the Trump Administration is repealing the
Clean Power Plan,6 which would regulate the greenhouse gas
1. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015).
2. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from
Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of
Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating
Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
60 and 63) [hereinafter MATS Rule].
3. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711 (“Even if the Agency could have considered
ancillary benefits when deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary—a point we need not address—it plainly did not do so here.”).
4. See Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff
Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1766 (2002) (discussing the difference between direct
and ancillary benefits). Throughout the literature, co-benefits are alternatively
referred to as ancillary benefits, secondary benefits, or indirect benefits. See
David Pearce, Policy Frameworks for the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Change
Policies, in ANCILLARY BENEFITS AND COSTS OF GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION
518 (2000). For simplicity, this Article uses the term “co-benefits.”
5. MATS Rule, supra note 2.
6. Trump Moves to Let States Regulate Coal Plant Emissions, NPR (Aug.
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emissions of power plants.7 A proposed rule to that effect has already been published.8 Attacking the consideration of co-benefits
is an important strategy in this quest. Indeed, it is only by completely disregarding the Clean Power Plan’s principal co-benefits—particulate reductions under the level of the NAAQS—that
the Trump Administration is able to conclude that the cost savings from repealing the rule exceed the forgone benefits.9 The
21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/21/639396683/trump-moves-to-let
-states-regulate-coal-plant-emissions (detailing President Trump’s targeting of
the Plan for repeal).
7. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,663 (Oct. 23,
2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan].
8. See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) [hereinafter Clean Power
Plan Proposed Repeal].
Instead of finalizing that repeal, as this Article was going to press, the EPA
proposed a significant roll-back of the Clean Power Plan. See Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating
Units, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746 (Aug. 31, 2018). As in the case of the proposed repeal,
see infra note 9, the forgone benefits are higher than the cost savings except
where all PM2.5 benefits below the NAAQS are ignored. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA-452/R-18-006, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS; REVISIONS TO EMISSION GUIDELINE
IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS; REVISIONS TO NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM,
at 6-16 tbl.6-14 (2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-08/
documents/utilities_ria_proposed_ace_2018-08.pdf. Even then, the proposed replacement appears net beneficial only under one of the three illustrative compliance scenarios modeled by the EPA. Id.
9. See Clean Power Plan Proposed Repeal, supra note 8, at 48,045–46. The
EPA presents the net benefits of repeal under different scenarios: rate-based
and mass-based implementation. At a 3% discount rate, net benefits of the repeal are negative in the year 2030—meaning that the forgone benefits from the
Clean Power Plan (or, put differently, the costs of repeal) are higher than the
benefits of repeal in every scenario, except where all PM2.5 benefits below the
NAAQS are ignored.
The EPA also presents calculations of benefits at a 7% discount rate, but
that figure is out of line with economists’ practice. See Richard G. Newell, Unpacking the Administration’s Revised Social Cost of Carbon, RESOURCES FOR
THE FUTURE (Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.rff.org/blog/2017/unpackingadministration-s-revised-social-cost-carbon (“It is clearly inappropriate . . . to
use such modeling results with OMB’s 7 percent discount rate, which is intended to represent the historical before-tax return on private capital. . . . Practically speaking, the use of such a high discount rate means that the effects of
our actions on future generations are largely unaccounted for in the new analysis. This is incompatible with the long-lived nature of greenhouse gas emissions
in the atmosphere, and the fact that damages from emissions today will continue to be felt for generations to come.”).
In order to justify the repeal, the EPA also needs to significantly downplay
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validity of co-benefits will certainly be at issue in the inevitable
ensuing litigation.10
Further, on remand from the Supreme Court in the Mercury
and Air Toxics Standards litigation, the EPA evaluated the reasonableness of the rule’s costs under multiple metrics and put
forward two approaches to demonstrate that the rule is cost-benefit justified in a Supplemental Finding; one of which includes a
discussion of co-benefits.11 However, because this method is the
EPA’s alternative approach, the D.C. Circuit would need to rule
on the validity of including co-benefits only if it does not uphold
the rule under the EPA’s preferred approach. The case is now
being held in abeyance12 while the Trump Administration considers whether to modify the Supplemental Finding.13 However,
if the Trump Administration reverses itself on the inclusion of

the direct benefits of carbon dioxide reductions. Cf. Niina Heikkinen, EPA Revises the Social Cost of a Potent Greenhouse Gas, SCI. AM. (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/epa-revises-the-social-cost-of-a
-potent-greenhouse-gas (reporting on the Trump Administration’s plans to reduce the “social cost of methane” measure and suggesting that the Administration could use this change to support deregulation on the grounds that compliance costs would outweigh the value of any methane reductions).
10. Cheryl Hogue, Trump Administration Is Considering Reweighing Costs
and Benefits of EPA Regulations, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (Aug. 5,
2018), https://cen.acs.org/policy/regulation/Trump-administration-considering
-reweighing-costs/96/i32 (arguing “[a] lawsuit challenging [the] repeal is inevitable” and co-benefits will factor strongly into the lawsuit).
11. See Supplemental Finding that It Is Appropriate and Necessary To Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,423–24 (Apr. 25, 2016) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) [hereinafter Supplemental Finding]. The EPA’s preferred
approach weighed the costs of compliance against the volumetric reduction in
hazardous air pollutants. Id. at 24,426. In turn, the Agency’s alternative approach compared the costs against the quantified benefits, including co-benefits
and unquantified benefits. See id. at 24,427, 24,437–42.
12. See Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 27, 2017)
(per curium) (order granted to continue oral argument).
13. See Respondent EPA’s Motion to Continue Oral Argument at 6, Murray
Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 18, 2017). It seems highly
likely that the Trump Administration will reverse the EPA’s position on the use
of co-benefits: in an early iteration of this litigation, former EPA Administrator
Scott Pruitt, then the Attorney General of Oklahoma, filed a brief, together with
a number of other state attorneys general and industry groups, strongly arguing
that the particulate reduction co-benefits were not cognizable for the purposes
of evaluating the permissibility of the EPA’s decision to regulate hazardous air
pollutant emissions of power plants. See Opening Brief of State and Industry
Petitioners at 41–55, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
18, 2016).
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co-benefits, environmental groups would likely challenge the decision, bringing the question before a federal court.14
How courts ultimately respond to challenges of the reliance
on co-benefits of particulate reductions below the NAAQS will
have far reaching consequences for climate change regulations,
as well as for public health rules more generally. Co-benefits of
particulate reductions under the NAAQS are a substantial portion of the total benefits from regulating the emissions from stationary sources and, strikingly, a substantial portion of the benefits of all federal regulation. The NAAQS standards are not
intended to eliminate all risks from pollutant exposure, so reductions beyond the standards have significant health benefits.
Indeed, EPA rules accounted for 61% to 80% of the monetized benefits from all major federal regulations over the past
ten years, and 98% to 99% of those monetized benefits come from
air quality rules.15 And, the large estimated benefits of air quality rules “are mostly attributable to the reduction in public exposure to fine particulate matter.”16 Furthermore, as the Mercury
and Air Toxics Standards and the Clean Power Plan illustrate,
a highly significant proportion of these reductions come from the
co-benefits of particulate reductions.17 The Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, in particular, have the second-highest quantified
benefits of all of the EPA’s twenty-two clean air rules of the past
decade.18 The EPA estimated $4 to $6 million in direct quantified
benefits under the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards from the
target hazardous pollutants,19 in addition to significant unquantified benefits,20 but quantified benefits of $37 to $90 billion in
health co-benefits from particulate reductions.21 For the Clean
14. See Hogue, supra note 10 (predicting a challenge to the repeal of the
Clean Power Plan).
15. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2016 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE
WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 2, 7–8, 11–12 (2016), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_
reports/draft_2016_cost_benefit_report_12_14_2016_2.pdf.
16. Id. at 12.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 55, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct.
2699 (2015) (No. 14-46).
20. See id. (“[V]irtually all of the direct benefits from reducing emissions of
hazardous air pollutants are unquantifiable.”).
21. Id. at 54; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-11-011, REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARDS, at 5-1
(2011) [hereinafter MATS RIA], https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/
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Power Plan, the EPA under President Obama calculated $20 billion in climate benefits, and an additional $13 to $31 billion from
particulate reduction co-benefits.22
The bulk of these particulate co-benefits come from reductions below the NAAQS.23 For example, in the case of the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, the EPA notes that a small percentage of the co-benefits come from reductions in particulate
matter above the NAAQS, as the regulation would help to bring
out-of-compliance areas into compliance, but that “[a] large fraction of the . . . related benefits . . . occur below the level of the
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS).”24
The preceding analysis reveals how much is at stake in the
controversy over the permissibility of relying on the co-benefits
of particulate reductions below the NAAQS. Ignoring these benefits will threaten significant regulatory initiatives and adversely affect populations such as the elderly and asthmatic children, who are particularly sensitive to the adverse health effects
caused by particulate matter at levels below the NAAQS.25

matsriafinal.pdf. These numbers were calculated using a 3% discount rate. Id.
22. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-15-003, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FINAL RULE, at ES-23, 4-27 (2015)
[hereinafter CLEAN POWER PLAN RIA], https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/
utilities_ria_final-clean-power-plan-existing-units_2015-08.pdf. This estimate
includes reductions in SO2, which is both a precursor to the formation of PM2.5
as well as a component of PM2.5 (since SO2 itself is often present as a fine particle). Id. at 4-11. Notably, the Clean Power Plan rule is cost-benefit justified
without these additional health benefits; the EPA estimated that the regulation
would cost between $5.1 and $8.4 billion in 2030, a range dwarfed by the total
estimated benefits of between $34 and $54 billion. See id. at ES-20, ES-22, ES
-23. Moreover, recent analyses of Clean Power Plan compliance costs suggest
that the cost of complying with the Plan has fallen since 2015, when the EPA’s
analysis was released. See DENISE A. GRAB & JACK LIENKE, INST. FOR POLICY
INTEGRITY, THE FALLING COST OF CLEAN POWER PLAN COMPLIANCE
1 (2017), https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Falling_Cost_of_CPP_
Compliance.pdf. These compliance costs fell due to declines in the cost of renewable energy, declines in the forecast price of natural gas, extensions of federal
tax credits for renewable energy, and expansions of state programs supporting
the adoption of clean energy. See generally id. (collecting and analyzing reports
of independent groups calculating the updated costs of compliance with the
Clean Power Plan).
23. MATS RIA, supra note 21, at ES-4.
24. Id.
25. In a 2017 study of Medicare recipients, discussed further in Part III,
researchers observed a rising risk of death in association with PM2.5 exposure
beginning at levels significantly below the NAAQS for PM2.5. Qian Di et al., Air
Pollution and Mortality in the Medicare Population, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2513, 2513 (2017). In a study of inner-city children with asthma, short-term
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Opponents of these regulations employ a few key arguments
to suggest that these benefits should not be cognizable in evaluating EPA regulations. In this Article, we address each of these
arguments in turn. Relying on scientific evidence, EPA practice,
and judicial decisions, we show that these arguments are unfounded.
Critics argue first that the benefits from particulate matter
reduction do not exist.26 They do so by assuming that particulate
matter is a threshold pollutant.27 By implication, these critics
make the same assumption for all “criteria pollutants,” which
are pollutants regulated by NAAQS pursuant to § 108 of the
Clean Air Act: ground level ozone, particulate matter, carbon
monoxide, lead, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen dioxide.28 A threshold is the level below which there are no quantifiable health effects from pollutant exposure,29 and threshold pollutants are
those pollutants for which a threshold can be identified. The
Clean Air Act requires that NAAQS levels allow an “adequate
increases in PM2.5 concentrations below the NAAQS were associated with adverse respiratory health effects. George T. O’Connor et al., Acute Respiratory
Health Effects of Air Pollution on Children with Asthma in US Inner Cities, 121
J. ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 1133, 1135 (2008).
26. See infra notes 286–90 and accompanying text; see also JONATHAN A.
LESSER, MISSING BENEFITS, HIDDEN COSTS: THE CLOUDY NUMBERS IN THE
EPA’S PROPOSED CLEAN POWER PLAN 5 (2016), https://www.manhattan
-institute.org/download/8988/article.pdf (“The EPA’s estimates of co-benefits
from future air-pollution reductions also suffer from significant uncertainty and
modeling errors . . . [including the] use of epidemiological models that assume
that there are no threshold air-pollution concentration levels below which additional health benefits cannot be obtained, even though under the Clean Air Act,
the EPA is required to establish exposure levels that are supposed to incorporate an adequate margin of safety to protect the public health . . . .”); id. at 18–
19 (“But because the magnitude of CO2 reductions under the [Clean Power Plan]
is below the threshold level (assumed to be the level where there are measurable
climate impacts), the [Plan]’s actual CO2 reduction benefits are effectively
zero.”); C. Boyden Gray, EPA’s Use of Co-Benefits, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (2015),
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/epa-s-use-of-co-benefits (“As a former Chairman of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality has explained, ‘[i]f reducing particulate matter had the enormous benefits that EPA’s
analysis claims, it has a legal responsibility to lower the national ambient
standard to a level that is actually protective of human health. The fact that it
has not done so suggests that the EPA does not really believe its own numbers.’
. . . [Agencies should not] be allowed to count reductions of pollutants in areas
where they appear below the national standard EPA has already set for those
pollutants.”).
27. See infra notes 286–93 and accompanying text.
28. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2012).
29. Al McGartland et al., Estimating the Health Benefits of Environmental
Regulations, 357 SCI. 457, 458 (2017).
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margin of safety . . . requisite to protect the public health.”30 The
logic of critics who claim criteria pollutants have a threshold is
that NAAQS are set with reference to the threshold, plus an adequate margin of safety.31 Thus, they argue, there should be no
adverse health effects below the threshold, and therefore, no
benefits from lowering pollution levels below the NAAQS.32
The Trump Administration has embraced these criticisms
despite their lack of empirical foundation. In its proposed rule to
repeal the Clean Power Plan, announced in October 2017, the
Trump EPA presents radically different estimates of the costs
and benefits than those presented in the original plan.33 The proposed rule includes three estimates of health benefits, the first
of which closely mirrors the estimates in the original rule promulgated during the Obama Administration and includes the full
range of particulate matter benefits.34 The middle estimate assumes—without scientific basis—that the benefits of particulate
matter reductions fall to zero below the “lowest measured level”
or LML, which is the lowest level of exposure studied.35 There is
no scientific support for the proposition that risks are nonexistent below this level, though there is greater uncertainty about
the magnitude of risk below this level.36 Finally, the lowest estimate of benefits incorporates the assumption that NAAQS represent a threshold for particulate matter.37 This estimate completely eliminates all particulate matter benefits below the
NAAQS,38 essentially ignoring a bulk of the benefits of the rule

30. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). According to the EPA, the margin of safety component is “intended to address uncertainties associated with inconclusive scientific and technical information available at the time of standard setting . . . [and]
to prevent lower pollutant levels that [the Administrator] finds pose an unacceptable risk of harm, even if that risk is not precisely identified as to nature or
degree.” Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,634, 24,634–35 (July 1, 1987) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 50) [hereinafter 1987 Revisions to NAAQS].
31. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
33. Compare Clean Power Plan Proposed Repeal, supra note 8, at 48,044–
47, with Clean Power Plan, supra note 7, at 64,928–29, 64,934–35.
34. See Clean Power Plan Proposed Repeal, supra note 8, at 48,044–47.
35. Id. at 48,044.
36. See infra notes 409–25 and accompanying text.
37. See Clean Power Plan Proposed Repeal, supra note 8, at 48,044 (setting
the threshold at the model-predicted air quality annual average).
38. See id. at 48,045–46 (calculating that there are fewer benefits associated with this measurement, while using the full range of ambient concentrations does not favor repeal due to the lare amount of benefits).
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in order to more easily justify its repeal.39 Even with the significant changes made to other cost and benefits estimates throughout the proposed rule, only this last estimate makes the repeal
cost-benefit justified.40 The issue of how particulate matter benefits are calculated will thus be of central importance in the inevitable slew of litigation challenging the repeal.41
The EPA’s own early treatment of criteria pollutants potentially contributed to confusion over whether these pollutants
have a threshold, as some early analyses arguably implied that
criteria pollutants had thresholds.42 However, the EPA has subsequently adjusted its practices in ways that make clear the
Agency views particulate matter and most criteria pollutants as
non-threshold.43
As a general matter, the EPA currently assumes that carcinogenic pollutants do not have a threshold and that non-criteria noncarcinogenic pollutants do have a threshold.44 In its earliest analyses in the late 1970s, the EPA treated criteria
pollutants similarly to other noncarcinogens.45 For example, the
Agency used language that suggested thresholds when setting

39. See id. at 48,043 (“[T]his analysis increases transparency of the 2015
[Clean Power Plan] analysis by presenting the energy efficiency cost savings as
a benefit rather than a cost reduction and provides a bridge to future analyses
that the agency is committed to performing. The current analysis also provides
alternative approaches for examining the forgone benefits, including more
clearly distinguishing the direct benefits from the co-benefits and exploring alternative ways to illustrate the impacts on the total net benefits of the uncertainty in health co-benefits at various PM2.5 cutpoints. This approach shifts the
focus to the domestic (rather than global) social cost of carbon, and employs both
3 percent and 7 percent discount rates. Finally, we consider how changing market conditions and technologies may have affected future actions that may have
been undertaken by states to comply with the [Clean Power Plan] and how these
changes may affect the potential benefits and costs of the [Plan’s] repeal.”).
40. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
41. See Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency BenefitCost Analysis, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 575, 578 (2015) (noting that “[a]s agencies rely more on [cost-benefit analyses] in their decision making, challenges to
[cost-benefit analyses] will rise, and judicial review of [cost-benefit analyses]
will become increasingly important”).
42. See infra note 182.
43. See infra Part II.C.
44. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS: ADVANCING
RISK ASSESSMENT 8 (2009) [hereinafter SCIENCE AND DECISIONS].
45. See infra note 182.
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allowable pollutant levels, such as the “critical populations, critical effects” model.46 However, as scientific research accumulated showing adverse health effects at lower concentrations, the
EPA quickly departed from this approach, and the Agency has
not treated criteria pollutants as threshold pollutants for several
decades under administrations of both parties.47 First, the EPA
has explicitly acknowledged in many NAAQS rulemakings that
there is no evidence to support the view that specific criteria pollutants have a threshold.48 Further, the EPA has stopped using
the “critical effects” language when setting NAAQS.49 Additionally, the EPA has calculated benefits for reducing criteria pollutants below NAAQS levels—a practice that is inconsistent with
the notion of a threshold.50 The EPA’s modern treatment of the
NAAQS moved the Agency in line with current science on this
question, which supports a non-threshold model.51
Critics next argue that the EPA “double counts” benefits by
claiming benefits already implemented through other regulations.52 For example, Senator John Barrasso asserted in an Environmental and Public Works Committee hearing in 2015 that
46. See infra notes 185–95 and accompanying text. The “critical populations, critical effects” model refers to a way of setting the NAAQS with reference
to a sensitive population and key early health effects of the pollutant. Id.
47. See infra Part III.B.
48. See infra Part II.C.
49. See infra notes 207–08 and accompanying text.
50. See infra Part II.C.
51. See infra Part II.C.
52. See Michael Bastach, Critics Accuse EPA of Fudging the Math on Its
Global Warming Rule, DAILY CALLER (Oct. 1, 2015), http://dailycaller.com/2015/
10/01/critics-accuse-epa-of-fudging-the-math-on-its-global-warming-rule (“Former Sen. John Kyl, an Arizona Republican, also criticized the EPA over doublecounting PM2.5 reduction benefits in its [Mercury and Air Toxics Standards]
rule. In 2012, Kyl took to the Senate floor to lambast the EPA for double-counting the benefits of reducing particulates.”); Jude Clemente, The Clean Power
Plan Is Irrelevant, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
judeclemente/2017/10/29/the-clean-power-plan-is-irrelevant (“And there seems
to be some serious ‘double counting’ going on under the promoted [Clean Power
Plan] benefits. That’s mostly because the emissions of criteria pollutants NOx,
SO2, and PM have been regulated for decades, but they are erroneously counted
in the claimed benefits of the [Plan].”); Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Ten Problems
with EPA’s Clean Power Plan Analysis, MANHATTAN INST. (Mar. 20, 2017),
https://economics21.org/html/ten-problems-epa’s-clean-power-plan-analysis
-2275.html (“If reductions in particulates can be counted as a health benefit of
reducing mercury, the first of three major rules put in place by EPA, the agency
cannot then count these same reductions as a benefit from reducing ozone and
carbon dioxide.”); Gray, supra note 26 (“[W]henever EPA counts PM2.5 or ozone
reductions in its cost-benefit analysis for other rules, it is double-counting reductions already mandated by the NAAQS.”).
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multiple EPA rules were using “the same reductions in particulate matter [to] claim the same health benefits,” including the
Clean Power Plan.53 Other opponents of the Clean Power Plan
likewise contend that “not only are [the Agency’s] estimates of
co-benefits highly subjective and uncertain, but the EPA has almost surely double-counted some of those estimates.”54 These
critics also allege that the Agency achieves the same end by failing to properly calibrate its baseline levels from which to measure costs and benefits.55 In fact, the EPA’s longstanding guidelines on baselines state that it is the Agency’s practice “to
assume full compliance with regulatory requirements,” including newly enacted regulations that are not yet implemented.56
Moreover, the EPA expressly discusses the methods by which it
accounts for benefits previously achieved under the NAAQS regime and other rules, which include an explanation of how the
Agency accounted for existing regulations of particulate matter.57
Finally, critics suggest that, even if these benefits are real
and not “double-counted,” they should not be considered in costbenefit analyses because they are “co-benefits” instead of direct
benefits.58 For example, while the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards primarily target mercury pollution59 and the Clean Power
Plan directly regulates carbon dioxide emissions,60 both rules

53. Economy-Wide Implication of President Obama’s Air Agenda: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, 114th Cong. 82 (2015) (statement of
Sen. John Barrasso) (“Yet when you take a look at the EPA’s own documents,
you [s]tate that you are counting co-benefits of reducing the same PM 2.5 in
other rules before [the] 111(d) rule for existing power plants was even released.”).
54. LESSER, supra note 26, at 19.
55. See id. at 5.
56. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC
ANALYSES, at 5-3 (2010) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC
ANALYSES].
57. See infra notes 431–40.
58. See Michael Bastach, Trump’s Executive Order to Repeal Regulations
Puts EPA in the Crosshairs, DAILY CALLER (Jan. 13, 2017), http://dailycaller
.com/2017/01/31/trumps-executive-order-to-repeal-regulations-puts-epa-in-the
-crosshairs (“Republicans have long criticized EPA for counting ‘co-benefits’ of
regulation towards its cost effectiveness.”); Furchtgott-Roth, supra note 52 (“If
EPA believes that their levels of other substances should be reduced, it should
issue rules to lower them, with their own comment periods and cost-benefit
analysis.”); infra notes 455–65 and accompanying text.
59. MATS Rule, supra note 2, at 9305.
60. Clean Power Plan, supra note 7, at 64,663, 64,710.
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would reduce particulate matter as well.61 Opponents claim that
accounting for co-benefits skews cost-benefit analyses in favor of
regulation62 and exceeds the statutory bounds of the EPA’s
power to regulate these pollutants under the Clean Air Act.63
The Trump Administration, a key critic of these rules, decries
these benefits and asserts that their inclusion “essentially
hid[es] the true net cost” of rules like the Clean Power Plan.64
This view, however, conflicts with four decades of EPA practice under administrations of both parties: the EPA during that
time has taken co-benefits under consideration when evaluating
air pollution regulations.65 Further, Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) Circular A-4, issued during the George W. Bush
Administration, instructs agencies like the EPA to look at and
consider co-benefits and their mirror image: indirect costs.66 Indirect costs are consistently calculated for Clean Air Act and
61. Id. at 64,670, 64,679; MATS Rule, supra note 2, at 9305. Some of these
rules would also have the co-benefit of reducing other criteria pollutants. See,
e.g., MATS Rule, supra note 2, at 9305, 9380 (noting incidental reductions in
sulfur dioxide pollution). While this Article focuses primarily on particulate
matter because of the scope of those benefits and the clarity of the scientific
evidence that particulate matter lacks a threshold, there is likewise no reason
to exclude co-benefits of reductions of other NAAQS pollutants where sufficient
evidence shows that such pollutants also lack a threshold.
62. See Kyle Feldscher, Senate Republicans Take Aim at Cost of EPA Regs,
WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/senate
-republicans-take-aim-at-cost-of-epa-regs (quoting Senator Mike Rounds’ statement that “[b]ecause of [its] exorbitant regulations, the EPA attempts to justify
. . . the costs by identifying ancillary benefits, which the EPA refers to as cobenefits, to help outweigh the cost of regulations”).
63. See Gray, supra note 26 (“EPA is treating the Clean Air Act as a completely open-ended grant of power, precisely as the Supreme Court forbids. . . .
The costs of complying with a given regulation should be compared against the
social goods that that regulation is authorized to achieve—not incidental cobenefits . . . .”); infra notes 445–54 and accompanying text.
64. News Releases: EPA Takes Another Step To Advance President Trump’s
America First Strategy, Proposes Repeal of “Clean Power Plan,” U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa
-takes-another-step-advance-president-trumps-america-first-strategy-proposes
-repeal.
65. See infra Part IV.B.
66. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS 26 (2003) [hereinafter CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS], https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/
a004/a-4.pdf (articulating that agencies should “look beyond the direct benefits
and direct costs . . . and consider any important ancillary benefits and countervailing risks”). Just as there are various terms for “co-benefits,” there are likewise multiple names for “indirect costs,” including countervailing risks. This
Article primarily uses the term “indirect costs” but occasionally employs “countervailing risks” as well.
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other EPA regulations,67 and it would be inconsistent to consider
the negative indirect effects of regulations without similarly considering the positive indirect effects.68 The benefits from reducing particulate matter below the levels of the NAAQS in terms
of avoided health harms and premature mortality are scientifically well established and have been acknowledged by the EPA
for decades.69 There is thus no reason to exclude them from analyses of air pollution regulations.
Courts likewise have long held that when a rule’s justification includes economic analyses, agencies may not ignore important costs or benefits, whether the effect is direct or ancillary.70 For example, the D.C. Circuit, the most important court
of appeals for federal environmental regulation,71 has held that
the EPA must consider indirect effects in its rulemakings.72 In
1999, the court remanded a revision to the NAAQS for ozone and
particulate matter because the Agency had failed to consider the
potential indirect health costs from strengthening the regulatory
standards.73 Likewise, in American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, the
court held that the Agency must consider incidental countervailing risks.74 More recently, in Sugar Corp. v. EPA the court upheld an EPA regulation that relied on co-benefits in its analysis
67. See Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 4, at 1786 (discussing the number of
bills that have been passed that discuss health risk tradeoffs); infra Part IV.B.
68. See generally id. (making the argument that ancillary benefits should
be considered, given the rise in consideration of risk tradeoffs).
69. See infra Part III.
70. E.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1036–37 (D.C. Cir.
1999), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531
U.S. 457 (2001).
71. Richard J. Lazarus, Senator Edmund Muskie’s Enduring Legacy in the
Courts, 67 ME. L. REV. 239, 242 (2015) (“[T]he D.C. Circuit of course is the nation’s most important court for federal environmental law because it has original jurisdiction to hear challenges to EPA rules promulgated under a host of
federal environmental laws, including the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, and
exclusive jurisdiction to consider some of those challenges.”).
72. E.g., id.
73. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1036–37.
74. Id. at 1051–53; cf. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1250
(2014) (“In a portion of its American Trucking opinion not reviewed by the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit stated that at least certain types of secondary
effects must be considered by the agency when setting the NAAQS. . . . The
court noted that it ‘seems bizarre that a statute intended to improve human
health would . . . lock the agency into looking at only one half of a substance’s
health effects in determining the maximum level for that substance.’ Thus, the
D.C. Circuit required the agency to account for the negative secondary consequences of regulation—the countervailing risks.” (quoting Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
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of the effects of reducing hazardous air pollutants from boilers,
process heaters, and incinerators.75 The labels “benefit” and
“cost” merely serve as useful shorthand for positive effects versus negative effects. In the context of cost-benefit analysis, neither possesses any inherent quality warranting different weight
or analytical treatment from the other.76
Because the frontal attack on the co-benefits of particulate
reductions below the NAAQS arose so recently, there is no existing academic literature in this area. Neither is there sustained
discussion on the evolution in the understanding of thresholds
for criteria pollutants following the enactment of the Clean Air
Act in 1970 or on how this understanding developed alongside
different approaches used for carcinogens and noncarcinogens
other than criteria pollutants. And there is no historical, scientific, and practical analysis of the question of how the competing
arguments on thresholds interact with cost-benefit analysis.
This Article fills these voids. Part I discusses the EPA’s approaches for assessing the risks of carcinogenic and noncarcinogenic pollutants other than criteria pollutants. The EPA has consistently treated carcinogens as non-threshold pollutants,
whereas for noncarcinogen, non-criteria pollutants, the EPA’s
approach has lagged behind the scientific evidence and assumes
that there is a no-harm threshold. Part II turns to criteria pollutants. It examines Congress’s growing doubts about the existence of NAAQS thresholds, which resulted in a significant conceptual change in the understanding of criteria pollutant
reflected in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act. It also
shows how the EPA’s approach has evolved, from embracing
threshold models in the 1970s to consistently rejecting them
since the 1980s. Part III addresses the critics’ first two arguments: that benefits from particulate matter reductions below
the NAAQS do not exist, and that the EPA erroneously “double
counts” benefits by failing to adjust its estimation baselines to
account for prior regulation of particulate matter. We explain the
scientific basis for calculating particulate matter benefits below
the NAAQS, as well as the EPA’s longstanding practice of measuring and quantifying these benefits. We also examine how the
175 F.3d at 1051–52)).
75. U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579, 591, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
76. See INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, THE IMPORTANCE OF EVALUATING
REGULATORY “CO-BENEFITS” 2 (2017), https://policyintegrity.org/files/media/
Co-Benefits_Factsheet.pdf (arguing that there is no “logical reason for agencies
to treat indirect benefits differently than indirect costs”).
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Agency deals with uncertainty and sets its baselines when revising the NAAQS. Part IV assesses the final assertion of the critics: that even if real, these benefits should not be included in
cost-benefit analyses when they are co-benefits as opposed to direct benefits. We discuss the treatment of co-benefits in a range
of contexts over the past four decades by academics, the EPA,
and the judiciary, and argue that there is no plausible justification for excluding them from cost-benefit analyses.
I. TRADITIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT MODELS
The EPA currently uses different risk assessment approaches for carcinogens, noncarcinogens, and NAAQS criteria
pollutants, respectively. This Part analyzes the Agency’s current
models for evaluating the health and environmental risks posed
by carcinogens and by noncarcinogens other than criteria pollutants.
A. CARCINOGENS
The EPA assumes that carcinogens have no thresholds unless sufficient pollutant-specific data leads the Agency to conclude that a particular carcinogen has a threshold.77 Under this
approach, the EPA first attempts to discern a “mode of action”
for carcinogens,78 which describes the sequence of key events and
77. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 127. The EPA will adjust
its model to include a threshold where there is such evidence. For example, the
EPA treats chloroform as a threshold carcinogen. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, CASRN 67-66-3, INTEGRATED RISK INFORMATION SYSTEM: CHLOROFORM CHEMICAL ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 1–2, 10 (2001), https://cfpub.epa.gov/
ncea/iris/iris_documents/documents/subst/0025_summary.pdf. However, the
EPA has not identified many exceptions to its general rule that carcinogens
should be treated as non-threshold and noncarcinogens should be treated as
having a threshold. See Wendy Wagner et al., Misunderstanding Models in Environmental and Public Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 335
(2010) (discussing the EPA’s assumption that carcinogens have no threshold of
effect and noting that the EPA has identified threshold carcinogens, including
chloroform, and has struggled with accommodating such exceptions). In 2000,
the D.C. Circuit spurred the Agency to action on chloroform, finding that the
EPA’s use of an assumption of linearity for chloroform violated the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-24 (2012), because it “openly
overrode the best available scientific evidence, which suggested that chloroform
is a threshold carcinogen.” Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286,
1290 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted).
78. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/630/P-03/001F, GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, at 1-10 (2005) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT], https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013
-09/documents/cancer_guidelines_final_3-25-05.pdf.
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processes resulting in cancer formation.79 When the EPA can determine the mode of action, it will model the risk-exposure relationship based on that mode of action.80 If the mode suggests a
linear, non-threshold relationship, the EPA will so model the relationship; if, in contrast, the mode suggests a threshold, the
EPA will model the threshold. Where the EPA does not have sufficient data to determine the mode of action, the Agency assumes
that pollutants that cause tumors in animals are harmful to humans,81 that cancer risks of these pollutants do not have a
threshold,82 and that the effects can be modeled by low dose linearity,83 which describes a relationship between exposure and
risk under which additional exposure will result in additional
risk at a constant rate.84
Next, the Agency reviews the evidence available from scientific studies and produces a “weight of evidence narrative,” which
is intended to assess the health impacts of a pollutant and the
79. Id. at 1-10 n.2 (defining “mode of action”).
80. See id. at 1-11, 1-11 n.3 (discussing the relationship between mode of
action and risk exposure).
81. Id. at 1-10 to -11.
82. See id. at 1-11, 1-11 n.3 (stating that “cancer risks are assumed to conform with low dose linearity” and that such models are necessarily non-threshold); SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 8 (“For cancer, it is generally
assumed that there is no dose threshold of effect . . . .”).
83. See GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 78, at
1-11.
84. See id. at 1-11 n.3 (“A low-dose-linear model is one whose slope [comparing dosage to risk] is greater than zero at a dose of zero. A low-dose-linear
model approximates a straight line only at very low doses; at higher doses . . .
[it] can display curvature.”). This approach comports with cancer policies of
other federal agencies. For example, the EPA, the FDA, and OSHA “all . . . employ a linear mathematical model for low-dose extrapolation” of carcinogenic
risk assessment. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-810, CHEMICAL
RISK ASSESSMENT: SELECTED FEDERAL AGENCIES’ PROCEDURES, ASSUMPTIONS, AND POLICIES 40, 173, 197 (2001), https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/
232303.pdf (noting the FDA’s assumption of a “linear, no-threshold approach”
for low dose cancer estimation, as well as OSHA’s acceptance of the “overwhelming scientific consensus . . . that genotoxins follow low-dose linear functions”);
cf. NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 68, NIOSH CHEMICAL CARCINOGEN POLICY 19 (2017) [hereinafter NIOSH CHEMICAL CARCINOGEN POLICY], https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2017-100/pdf/2017-100.pdf?id=10.26616/
NIOSHPUB2017100revised (“For carcinogen risk assessment, the NIOSH generally treats exposure-response as low-dose linear unless a non-linear mode of
action has been clearly established, in which case the NIOSH will adopt a modeling approach defined by the data (including non-linear approaches when appropriate). In general, whether the model forms are linear or non-linear, any
nonzero exposure to a carcinogen is expected to yield some excess risk of cancer.”).
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strength of the evidence of those effects.85 The EPA considers
factors such as whether tumors were found in humans or animals, the agent’s chemical and physical properties, and studies
addressing its mode of action.86 The Agency uses standard descriptors to express the weight of the evidence: “Carcinogenic to
Humans, Likely to Be Carcinogenic to Humans, Suggestive Evidence of Carcinogenic Potential, Inadequate Information to Assess Carcinogenic Potential, and Not Likely to Be Carcinogenic.”87
Dose response assessments, the next phase of the EPA’s
analysis of risk from carcinogens, are generally completed for
pollutants labeled “Carcinogenic to Humans” and “Likely to Be
Carcinogenic to Humans.”88 Dose response assessments aim to
measure health effects at different exposure levels.89 These assessments are performed by first assessing data to determine a
“point of departure,”90 which “marks the beginning of extrapolation to lower doses” based on experimental data.91 Above the
point of departure, the EPA attempts to develop a tailored model
of dose-response pattern.92 Where the EPA lacks sufficient data
to develop one, the Agency states that “an appropriate policy
choice” is to use a standard curve-fitting model, which is a standardized mathematical function for drawing a trend line among
data points.93 Below the point of departure, the EPA assumes
that risk is related to exposure in a linear pattern.94
The EPA’s cancer guidelines emphasize that “a critical analysis of all of the [relevant] available information . . . [is] the starting point from which a default option may be invoked if needed
to address uncertainty or the absence of critical information.”95

11.

85. GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 78, at 1-

86. Id.
87. Id. at 1-12 (internal quotations omitted).
88. Id. at 3-2.
89. Id. at 1-12.
90. Id. at 1-13.
91. Id. at 1-13 n.4.
92. See id. at 1-14 (“The first step of dose-response assessment is evaluation
within the range of observation.”).
93. Id. at 1-9 to -10.
94. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 127 (“After adjustment
for animal-human differences in the dose metric, risk is assumed to decrease
linearly with doses below the [point of departure] for carcinogens . . . .”).
95. GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 78, at 1-7
(emphasis added).
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Thus, if evidence emerges that a particular carcinogenic pollutant does in fact have a threshold, or is non-linear at low levels
or all levels (for example if data instead suggests a logarithmic
relationship), the EPA may depart from the default no-threshold, linear model.96
Other agencies have taken similar approaches to regulating
carcinogens. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), under its guidance for regulating potential carcinogens,97 has not standardized its classification and regulation of
carcinogens to the degree that the EPA has. Rather than identifying default models that will be used when data is insufficient
to tailor a model, as the EPA has done, OSHA will evaluate arguments for a “threshold” effect in an individual rulemaking, but
only if there is sufficient evidence to suggest there may be levels
of exposure below which no health effects are observed.98 Further, OSHA guidance has been affected by the landmark Benzene
Case in which the Supreme Court struck down OSHA’s standard
for exposure to benzene.99 The Labor Secretary had set that
standard at one ppm (one part benzene per million parts air) after concluding that, because benzene was a carcinogen, no level
of exposure to this substance was safe.100 The Court faulted the
Secretary for not quantifying the reduction in risks that resulted
from tightening the prior standard of ten ppm.101 In order to satisfy the requirements of the Benzene Case, OSHA now estimates
“the risk to workers subject to a lifetime of exposure at various
possible exposure levels.”102 It is more difficult to discern what

96. A linear model is not synonymous with a non-threshold model. See id.
at 1-11 n.3. A non-threshold model may be non-linear, so long as it includes
health effects even at very low levels. Id.
97. See 29 C.F.R. § 1990.101–.152 (2017) (providing guidance for the identification, classification, and regulation of carcinogens).
98. See id. § 1990.143. The scientific evidence for a threshold, below which
adverse health effects do not occur, must comport with certain research requirements such as the length of time of the study and size of the population group
studied. See id. § 1990.144 (providing “criteria for consideration of arguments
on certain issues,” including threshold status); id. § 1990.145 (providing criteria
for “consideration of substantial new issues or substantial new evidence”).
99. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL–CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene Case),
448 U.S. 607, 662 (1980).
100. Id. at 613.
101. See id. at 630–34 (finding that though a ten ppm standard was reasonable, the Agency lacked sufficient support for a further reduction to one ppm).
102. Chemical Management and Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs), 79
Fed. Reg. 61,384, 61,387 (proposed Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pts. 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918, and 1926).
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OSHA’s specific models are for evaluating risks posed by carcinogens. However, OSHA carcinogen guidance makes clear that
the Agency treats carcinogens as non-threshold pollutants.103
The Agency develops models for risk that “best fit the existing
data and are consistent with available information on mode of
action,” but also notes that there is “a reasonable body of scientific evidence that genotoxic carcinogens, and perhaps other carcinogenic modes of action, display linear, non-threshold behavior
at very low dose levels.”104
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), established under the same legislation as OSHA105
and empowered to “develop and establish recommended occupational safety and health standards,”106 recently released a revised chemical carcinogen policy.107 NIOSH, like the EPA, generally treats the exposure response relationship as linear at low
doses, which implies a non-threshold model.108 Also like the
EPA, NIOSH will depart from this model where a non-linear

103. See 29 C.F.R. § 1990.143(h) (“No determination will be made that a
‘threshold’ or ‘no-effect’ level of exposure can be established for a human population exposed to carcinogens in general, or to any specific substance.”).
104. Chemical Management and Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs), 79
Fed. Reg. at 61,391.
105. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84
Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–75, 677–78 (2012), 42
U.S.C. § 3142-1 (2012)). The section creating NIOSH is found at 29 U.S.C. § 671
(2012).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 671(c)(1). NIOSH was originally conceived as the research
arm of a coordinated federal effort to regulate workplace safety, and OSHA was
to be the standard-setting agency. See About NIOSH, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/about/
default.html (“The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 established
NIOSH as a research agency focused on the study of worker safety and health.”);
All About OSHA, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. (2006), https://
www.osha.gov/Publications/about-osha/3302-06N-2006-English.html (“The
OSH Act established the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
in the Department of HHS as the research agency for occupational safety and
health. NIOSH conducts research on various safety and health problems, provides technical assistance to OSHA, and recommends standards for OSHA’s
consideration.”).
107. See NIOSH CHEMICAL CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 84. NIOSH’s
2017 guidance on carcinogens post-dates OSHA’s guidance, which was published in 1980. Compare id., with 29 C.F.R. § 1990 (1980). As such, it is not
entirely clear how extensively OSHA relies on NIOSH data to set regulations
on carcinogens in the workplace. OSHA guidance does, however, reference consulting with the Director of the NIOSH. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1990.104, 1990.106
(2017).
108. See NIOSH CHEMICAL CARCINOGEN POLICY, supra note 84.
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mode of action has been clearly established.109 Further, NIOSH
explicitly notes that even where there is evidence of a non-linear
relationship between risk and exposure at low doses, “it is highly
unlikely that one can demonstrate empirically that a threshold
exists.”110
In summary, the EPA, OSHA, and NIOSH all treat carcinogens as non-threshold contaminants, and make this determination based on the relevant scientific evidence. Further, the EPA
and NIOSH both assume linearity at low doses, unless the data
strongly suggests a different relationship between exposure and
risk to health. The assumption of non-threshold low dose linearity presumes health impacts even at very low levels of exposure.111 Because health effects can be estimated at low doses under this model, the agencies can include these health benefits in
cost-benefit analyses used to support allowable standards for
carcinogenic pollutants. Considering these benefits of pollution
regulation allows agencies to more accurately weigh the effects
of regulations at different stringencies, facilitating more informed decision-making.
Accounting for adverse health impacts from very low levels
of pollution does not mean that the EPA or other agencies must
or will require the elimination of that pollutant.112 For example,
109. See id. (“For carcinogen risk assessment, NIOSH generally treats exposure-response as low-dose linear unless a non-linear mode of action has been
clearly established, in which case NIOSH will adopt a modeling approach defined by the data (including non-linear approaches when appropriate).”).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Commentators have suggested that the non-threshold approach to carcinogens was responsible for the EPA’s reluctance to list carcinogenic pollutants
during the 1970s and much of the 1980s. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Against
“Individual Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 1121, 1150 (2005) (“Thus EPA faced the dilemma of either banning all
emissions of carcinogenic pollutants (with huge economic costs) or allowing
some emissions and therewith a nonzero probability of some deaths, in apparent
violation of the ‘ample margin of safety’ language of section 112.”); John P.
Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 251–52
(1990) (discussing the EPA’s use of “cumbersome” regulatory processes to avoid
making tough choices); Bradford C. Mank, What Comes After Technology: Using
an “Exceptions Process” to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of Hazardous Air
Pollutants, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 263, 268 (1994) (“The ‘ample margin of safety’
language proved counterproductive because the EPA was reluctant to effectively shut down entire industries by listing pollutants, where such listing
would require zero emission standards.”); Deanna Schmitt, Note, North Carolina Air Toxics Regulations, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1579, 1581–82 (1991) (“To avoid
such dire consequences and in response to pressure from industry, the EPA instead chose only to regulate a few pollutants.”). Originally, § 112 of the Clean
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under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),113 the EPA is required to set maximum contaminant level goals (MCLG), which
is the maximum level of a contaminant in drinking water at
which no known or anticipated health effects would occur.114
When the EPA regulates carcinogens under the SDWA, the
Agency sets the MCLG at zero where there is evidence that the
chemical may cause cancer, and there is no dose below which the
chemical is considered safe.115 However, the MCLG is not an enforceable standard. Rather, the enforceable standard, known as
the maximum contaminant level, is set as close to the MCLG as
Air Act required an “ample margin of safety” for “hazardous air pollutants.” 42
U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat.
2399, 2531 (1990). Because carcinogens have no threshold below which they are
safe, EPA officials feared listing a pollutant as a carcinogen might forbid emitting the pollutant at all, shuttering entire industries. See Adler, supra; Dwyer,
supra, at 251; Mank, supra; Schmitt, supra, at 1581. However, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that zero tolerance for carcinogens was not an appropriate approach, at least with regard to OSHA regulations. In the Benzene Case,
Justice Stevens relied heavily on statutory language mandating that OSHA
only regulate standards for toxic materials “to the extent feasible,” and determined that before the Agency enact more stringent standards, OSHA had to
determine the regulated chemical exposure posed “significant risks of harm.”
Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S.
607, 612, 641 (1980). Eventually the EPA linked safety to “best available technology” standards: after identifying the lowest level of emissions possible with
the best available technology, the EPA would decide whether to set emissions
at an even lower level by weighing the reduction in health risks against the
costs of setting the lower standard. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d
1146, 1163–64 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In 1987, the D.C. Circuit rejected this approach,
favoring instead a two-step process in which the EPA first determined what
would be an “acceptable” risk to health without any consideration of cost or
technological capability, and in a second step, determined the ample margin of
safety, incorporating feasibility considerations. Id. at 1164–65. The EPA then
settled on this approach for regulating carcinogenic air pollutants: the EPA
would set standards so that the maximally exposed individual had a risk of one
in ten-thousand or less, and if economically feasible, further regulate the pollutant to minimize the number of people with a risk greater than one in one million. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 54 Fed.
Reg. 38,044, 38,044–45 (Sept. 14, 1989) (40 C.F.R. pt. 61); Adler, supra, at 1151.
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-24 (2012).
114. Id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(A) (“Each maximum contaminant level goal established under this subsection shall be set at the level at which no known or anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur and which allows an
adequate margin of safety.”).
115. See How EPA Regulates Drinking Water Contaminants, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/dwregdev/how-epa-regulates
-drinking-water-contaminants#develop (last updated June 6, 2018) (“For chemical contaminants that are carcinogens, EPA sets the MCLG at zero if . . . there
is evidence that a chemical may cause cancer [and] there is no dose below which
the chemical is considered safe.”).
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feasible, taking into consideration costs and available technology.116 In short, even where the EPA recognizes that a carcinogen is unsafe at any level, the Agency can, and does, set standards above zero. Including health costs from low level exposure
to carcinogenic pollutants does not force the EPA to ban the pollutant; it merely facilitates more informed decisions about how
to regulate these pollutants.
A proposed rule released April 30, 2018 would move the EPA
away from its longstanding use of a default linear dose response
model, purportedly because “there is growing empirical evidence
of non-linearity in the concentration-response function for specific pollutants and health effects.”117 The proposed rule would
encourage the EPA to incorporate a variety of “competing” models on low dose risk assessment, including linear but also threshold, U-shaped, J-shaped, and bell-shaped models.118 Yet the EPA
cites no studies in support of the assertion that there is empirical
evidence of non-linearity, nor does it mention any pollutants in
particular as justification of the rule.119 The proposed rule also
does not mention its current cancer guidelines or the guidelines’
default assumption of low-dose linearity in the absence of evidence to the contrary.120 However, the proposed rule could dramatically impact the default assumptions used by the Agency in
regulating carcinogenic pollutants. It would apply to all significant regulatory actions121 and specifically refers to the “dose re-

116. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(B)–(D).
117. Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg.
18,768, 18,770 (proposed Apr. 30, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30) [hereinafter Strengthening Transparency].
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Id.; see also Maria Hegstad, Draft Science Rule Targets EPA’s Use of
Strict Default Linear ‘Dose’ Models, INSIDE EPA (May 2, 2018), https://insideepa
.com/daily-news/draft-science-rule-targets-epas-use-strict-default-linear-dose
-models (discussing the responses of both critics and supporters of the proposed
rule and the potential result of less stringent regulations).
121. The regulation incorporates the definition of “significant regulatory actions” included in Executive Order 12,866. See Strengthening Transparency, supra note 117, at 18,771. Executive Order 12,866 defines “significant regulatory
actions” as:
any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that may: (1) Have
an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely
affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or
State, local, or tribal governments or communities; (2) Create a serious
inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned
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sponse data and models that underlie . . . ‘pivotal regulatory science.’”122 There is nothing in the proposed rule to suggest that it
does not encompass carcinogenic pollutants. The EPA’s posture
in this proposed rule suggests a drastic departure in the
Agency’s treatment of carcinogens and other pollutants for
which there is strong evidence of linearity of health effects.
B. NONCARCINOGENS OTHER THAN CRITERIA POLLUTANTS
In contrast to carcinogens, the EPA treats noncarcinogens
other than criteria pollutants as threshold pollutants. The EPA
assumes that there is a threshold below which such pollutants
do not have adverse health impacts,123 despite the fact that this
assumption is inconsistent with modern scientific understanding.124 This Section analyzes the EPA’s current practice and then
criticizes its continued reliance upon this assumption.
The EPA assessments for noncarcinogens focus on finding a
“reference dose,” which is the quantity “likely to be without an
appreciable risk of deleterious effects.”125 The reference dose is
derived from the point of departure, which is the point from
which the EPA extrapolates the risk-exposure relationship.126
by another agency; (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations
of recipients thereof; or (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out
of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or the principles set forth
in this Executive order.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. §§ 638, 641–42 (1994).
122. Strengthening Transparency, supra note 117, at 18,770 (defining “pivotal regulatory science” as the “studies, models, and analyses that drive the
magnitude of the benefit-cost calculation, the level of a standard, or point-ofdeparture from which a reference value is calculated. In other words, they are
critical to the calculation of a final regulatory standard or level, or to the quantified costs, benefits, risks and other impacts on which a final regulation is
based”).
123. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 128 (“For noncancer end
points, it is assumed that homeostatic and defense mechanisms lead to a dose
threshold (that is, there is low-dose nonlinearity) below which effects do not occur or are extremely unlikely.”); LOUIS THEODORE & R. RYAN DUPONT, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND HAZARD RISK ASSESSMENT: PRINCIPLES AND CALCULATIONS 289 (2012) (“The noncancer hazard quotient assumes that there is a
level of exposure . . . below which it is unlikely for even sensitive populations to
experience adverse health effects . . . .”).
124. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44 (“Noncancer effects do not
necessarily have a threshold, or low-dose nonlinearity . . . .”).
125. Id. at 128 (quoting U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A REVIEW OF THE REFERENCE DOSE AND REFERENCE CONCENTRATION PROCESSES, at 4-4 (2002),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-12/documents/rfd-final.pdf ) .
126. See id. (“As in cancer dose-response assessment, the [reference dose] is
also derived from a [point of departure], which could be a no-observed-adverse-
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For non-cancer pollutants, this point of departure is generally
the no-observed-adverse-effect level (NOAEL),127 which is “the
highest exposure level at which no statistically or biologically
significant increases are seen in the frequency or severity of adverse effect[s],”128 or the lowest-observed-adverse-effect level
(LOAEL), which is “[t]he lowest dose in a study in which there
was an observed toxic or adverse effect.”129 The reference dose
might also be derived based on the “benchmark dose,” which is
calculated using “a predetermined change in the response rate
of an adverse effect.”130 Once the EPA determines the NOAEL,
LOAEL, or benchmark dose, the Agency divides that dose by the
“uncertainty factor,” a margin of safety intended in part to reflect
the possible differences between human and animal responses.131 The resulting number is the reference dose.132 This
model presumes a threshold at the reference dose: below this exposure level, the health risk from exposure to noncarcinogenic
pollutants is considered to be effectively zero.133
Modern scientific studies have challenged the accuracy of
the EPA’s threshold approach for noncarcinogens, and suggest
that many of these pollutants do not have a population threshold.134 Epidemiological studies now provide information about
the health impacts of pollutants across a range of human exposures, including at very low levels.135 Most significantly, a 2009
effect level (NOAEL) or a benchmark dose (BMD).”).
127. See id.
128. Conducting a Human Health Risk Assessment: Dose-Response, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/risk/conducting-human-health
-risk-assessment#tab-3 (last updated June 20, 2017) [hereinafter Conducting
Human Health Risk Assessment].
129. ToxTutor, Glossary, NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH, https://toxtutor.nlm.
nih.gov/glossary.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2018); see Conducting Human
Health Risk Assessment, supra note 128 (stating that the EPA uses LOAEL “in
cases in which a NOAEL has not been demonstrated experimentally”).
130. Conducting Human Health Risk Assessment, supra note 128.
131. See id. (“These uncertainty factors take into account the variability and
uncertainty that are reﬂected in possible differences between test animals and
humans (generally 10-fold or 10x) and variability within the human population
(generally another 10x) . . . .”).
132. See id. (“Thus, the RfD is determined by use of the following equation:
RfD = NOAEL (or LOAEL or BMDL)/UFs.”).
133. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 128.
134. See id. at 8.
135. See McGartland et al., supra note 29 (“Epidemiological studies of criteria air pollutants provide dose-response relationships applicable across a range
of human exposures. These dose-response functions allow for quantifying and
monetizing the benefits of reducing exposures at every level of exposure.”).
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report of the National Research Council of the National Academy
of Sciences136—an independent organization comprised of distinguished scholars in science and engineering,137 dedicated to the
use of science and technology to improve the general welfare, and
created by an act of Congress with a mandate to provide independent and objective advice to the federal government138—explained that the EPA’s current threshold assumption model for
noncarcinogens is based on outdated approaches developed between the 1950s and the 1980s.139 The report observed that noncarcinogenic pollutants do not necessarily have a threshold,140
and recommended that the EPA evaluate all noncarcinogens
without assuming that they have a threshold.141 According to the
report, the current model yields end products “inadequate for
benefit-cost analyses or for comparative risk analyses,”142 and
instead “creates an inconsistent approach for bringing toxicology
and risk science into the decision-making process.”143 The EPA
has largely ignored this particular recommendation from the
2009 report and has not changed its model for assessing noncarcinogens.144
136. See generally SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44.
137. NAS was chartered by the Senate in 1863 with the purpose to, “whenever called upon by any department of the Government, investigate, examine,
experiment, and report upon any subject of science or art.” Steve Olson, The
National Academy of Sciences at 150, PNAS EARLY EDITION 1, 1 (2014), http://
www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_2/9327.full. The organization is “a private agency with the public role of advising the government on policy-related
technical issues.” Id. The National Research Council is the “principal operating
agency” of the National Academies. Articles of Organization of the National Research Council, NAT’L ACADEMIES SCI., ENGINEERING & MED. (June 1, 2015),
http://www.nationalacademies.org/nasem/na_070358.html.
138. The National Research Council was established in 1916 at the request
of President Wilson to recruit specialists to participate in the National Academy
of Sciences’ advisory work for the government. See History, NAT’L ACAD. SCI.,
http://www.nasonline.org/about-nas/history (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
139. See McGartland et al., supra note 29. The report concluded that the
EPA’s approach is no longer scientifically supportable, as it “does not make the
best possible use of available scientific evidence.” SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 177.
140. SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44.
141. See id. at 132 (“There are multiple toxicants . . . for which low-dose linear concentration-response functions rather than thresholds have been derived
for noncancer end points . . . for critical end points driving the risk characterization at low doses, such cases may be common, and a new framework and practice are needed.”).
142. Id. at 133.
143. Id.
144. It is interesting to note that Dr. Thomas Burke, who chaired the NAS
committee that wrote SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, served as the Deputy Assistant
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Even if there were a threshold for an individual of average
sensitivity, that level would, by definition, be lower for more sensitive individuals. Especially sensitive individuals would have
an even lower threshold. And for the most sensitive individuals
in a population, there might be no threshold at all.145 While there
might be individual thresholds for average people, there would
be no population threshold—the level at which a population experiences no negative health effects.146 Thus, deciding to treat
one individual’s threshold as a population threshold is necessarily a decision to leave some individuals—those with lower
thresholds—unprotected. For example, very young children,
pregnant women, or the elderly might have harm thresholds for
certain pollutants that are much lower than the average population threshold.147 By assuming a threshold for a typical person,
the EPA overlooks sensitive individuals who may experience
negative health impacts at exposure levels lower than the regulatory standard. The question of how many people to leave unprotected is ultimately a policy question. An accurate accounting

Administrator of the EPA’s Office of Research and Development during the
Obama Administration and did not, during that time, usher in implementation
of the SCIENCE AND DECISIONS recommendation to eschew the threshold assumption for noncarcinogens. See About the Deputy Assistant Administrator of
EPA’s Office of Research and Development, and EPA’s Science Advisor, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Jan. 19, 2017), https://19january2017snapshot.epa
.gov/aboutepa/about-deputy-assistant-administrator-epas-office-research-anddevelopment-and-epas-science_.html.
145. See SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 153 (“[A study on individual thresholds] provides good physiologic plausibility of low-dose linearity on
a population basis, given ubiquitous exposures that imply that a substantial
number of people will be found to be at least as sensitive as the 99.9th percentile
individual.”).
146. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUMMARY OF EXPERT OPINIONS ON THE
EXISTENCE OF A THRESHOLD IN THE CONCENTRATION-RESPONSE FUNCTION FOR
PM2.5-RELATED MORTALITY 16 (2010), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/
Benefits/thresholdstsd.pdf (defining a population threshold as “the concentration below which no member of the study population would experience an increased risk of death”).
147. See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 78 Fed. Reg. 3086, 3104 (Jan. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50,
51, 52, 53, and 58) [hereinafter NAAQS Particulate Matter] (“There is emerging,
though still limited, evidence for additional potentially at-risk populations, such
as those with diabetes, people who are obese, pregnant women, and the developing fetus.”); Bingheng Chen & Haidong Kan, Air Pollution and Population
Health: A Global Challenge, 13 ENVTL. HEALTH & PREVENTIVE MED. 94, 96
(2008) (noting that for “[a]dverse health effects associated with exposure to air
pollution . . . [h]igh-risk subgroups include young children, the elderly, persons
with predisposed diseases, and persons with low socioeconomic status (SES)”).
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of the effects of these pollutants on sensitive people does not necessitate draconian regulations to completely eliminate all risks;
rather this information facilitates more informed decision-making that accurately accounts for the impacts on all members of
the population.
The current threshold model also ignores all scientific evidence of health effects that lacks a high level of confidence. This
problem is built in to the EPA’s process for determining the limits for these pollutants: when the EPA determines standards, it
performs a benefits analysis that includes evidence of different
health impacts of the pollutant.148 It classifies evidence as
“likely” or “known” if there is a “high degree of confidence in the
association between exposure and a health outcome,” or as “suggestive” where there is lesser confidence in the link.149 “Suggestive” evidence is generally excluded from the potential health
risks assessed by the EPA in its primary benefits analysis for
noncarcinogenic effects.150 As a result, the EPA essentially gives
no weight to health effects that have not been conclusively
demonstrated when determining the benefits of a regulation. In
effect, the EPA imposes a sharp discontinuity in the level of risk
depending on how the Agency classifies the evidence: the Agency
assumes there is a risk associated with “known” and “likely” evidence, the specific level of which is based on data, but assumes
a zero percent probability of risk when evidence is “suggestive.”
But the probability of an adverse impact is not zero.151 “Suggestive” evidence, instead, presents some other positive level of risk
which is arbitrarily ignored.
Economics has a way of addressing uncertainty without ignoring it completely. Using the concept of expected value, economists can incorporate the level of uncertainty into the calculation of overall risk.152 In the example of noncarcinogenic
pollutants, if the EPA employed this concept, the expected value
148. McGartland et al., supra note 29, at 457 (“EPA risk assessments for
cancer and ‘criteria’ air pollutants . . . use standard terms to summarize the
strength of evidence regarding a health effect.”).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 457–58 (“This practice implicitly assumes that exposed populations have zero [adverse impacts] for reduced exposure when there is some
evidence of an adverse health effect but that evidence is not unambiguous. This
assumption . . . is contradicted by findings.”).
152. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
IN THE FACE OF UNCERTAINTY 167–69 (2013) (discussing the applications of
value-of-information analysis, which attempts to quantify uncertainty and the
value of additional information).
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of the health risk posed by exposure to these pollutants would
incorporate both the best estimates for overall harm from exposure and the level of uncertainty. The fact of uncertainty would
lower the estimated potential risk, but some level of risk would
still be calculated from exposure at low levels.
Another way to better account for this risk would be to look
at the willingness of individuals to pay to avoid risks from low
level exposures. The “willingness to pay” measure can be calculated by directly asking people what they would hypothetically
pay to avoid a risk, or by comparing wages from similar jobs that
are more or less risky.153 Workers who take riskier jobs receive
higher wages to compensate for that risk.154 By measuring this
difference, it is possible to calculate the risk premium, or willingness to pay for the additional risk posed by the job.155 By assuming there is zero risk below the threshold, the EPA has presumed that there is zero willingness to pay to avoid low level
exposure. There is evidence to suggest, however, that individuals
actually display a greater willingness to pay when risk is ambiguous than they do for unambiguous risks with the same expected
value.156 A willingness to pay or expected value model would better account for the magnitude and the certainty of these risks.
The EPA’s failure to update its noncarcinogen model to account for more recent scientific evidence, sensitive populations,
and scientific uncertainties has important policy implications.
Because the EPA ignores risks below the threshold, the Agency
is unable to fully incorporate data on health effects at low levels
of exposure. The EPA cannot calculate what percentage of the
population or how many additional people would be protected by
reductions in pollution below the reference dose. Further, when
the EPA regulates these pollutants it does not include any health
benefits from reducing pollution below the reference dose, thus
153. See John Bronsteen et al., Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1645–46 (2013) (discussing two measures of willingnessto-pay: revealed preferences and surveys of hypothetical willingness to pay for
a given benefit).
154. Id. at 1646.
155. Id.
156. See Paul A. Kivi & Jason F. Shogren, Second-Order Ambiguity in Very
Low Probability Risks: Food Safety Valuation, 35 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON.
443, 454 (2010) (finding in the context of food safety that “people prefer unambiguous food safety choices over ambiguous ones with the same expected value,”
asserting that “[a]mbiguity premiums—how much more people are willing to
pay to avoid an ambiguous situation than an equivalent unambiguous one—are
positive” for scenarios the authors tested, and noting that the findings are consistent with previous studies).
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undercounting potential benefits of regulation. The resulting
standards therefore do not reflect any potential harm from
lower-level exposure. If the EPA instead modeled the marginal
risk of reductions or increases in dose exposure at every level
using a tool like willingness to pay or expected value, the Agency
would be able to calculate with greater accuracy the overall costs
and benefits of different levels of regulation, which would facilitate more informed decision-making.
II. TREATMENT OF CRITERIA POLLUTANTS
The previous Part analyzed the EPA’s risk assessment models of carcinogens and noncarcinogens other than criteria pollutants. That discussion provides a useful foundation upon which
to examine NAAQS criteria pollutants. The EPA’s understanding of criteria pollutants has evolved over five decades of implementing the Clean Air Act, shifting from a model that resembled
the one used for other noncarcinogens, which are treated as
threshold contaminants, to one that more closely approximates
its handling of carcinogens, which are treated as non-threshold
contaminants. Under multiple presidential administrations of
both parties, the Agency has calculated benefits from reducing
criteria pollutants below the NAAQS, thereby acting inconsistently with the existence of thresholds. Further, recent EPA rules
have explicitly stated that there is no evidence of thresholds for
certain criteria pollutants.
This Part first explores Congress’s understanding of criteria
pollutants, and describes how even by the mid-1970s, Congress
had already recognized that criteria pollutants likely do not have
thresholds. It then presents the EPA’s revision of lead NAAQS
in 1978 and 2008 as a case study demonstrating the EPA’s shift
away from threshold language in its promulgation of criteria pollutant standards. The Part concludes with a survey of the EPA’s
rejection of thresholds, both in its rulemaking language and in
its calculation of benefits, for the remaining criteria pollutants
excepting particulate matter, which receives an in-depth examination in Part III.
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A. CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977
The NAAQS criteria pollutants are six air pollutants for
which there are clearly established public health concerns at historic ambient levels.157 The Clean Air Act governs the “establishment, review, and revision” of the NAAQS to “provide protection
for the nation’s public health and the environment.”158 Healthbased standards have been developed for each pollutant, and the
standards are periodically reviewed based on human exposure
assessments, health risk assessments, and ecological risk assessments.159
Critics of clean air regulations have asserted that the
NAAQS levels are adequate to fully address criteria pollutant
risks, and that reductions in these pollutants below the level of
the standard are not beneficial.160 Even though the statute does
not refer to thresholds, some of these critics argue that thresholds are implied by the statutory requirement commanding the
EPA to set the NAAQS at levels that, “allowing an adequate
margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.”161
This argument requires the significant leap of equating “requisite to protect the public health” with a no-risk standard.
An examination of the legislative history of the 1977 Clean
Air Act Amendments reveals that in the years following the 1970
Act, Congress developed a more nuanced understanding of the

157. SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 368.
158. Criteria Air Pollutants: Process of Reviewing the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
criteria-air-pollutants/process-reviewing-national-ambient-air-quality
-standards (last updated July 10, 2018); see also Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401(b)(1) (2012) (“The purposes of this subchapter are—(1) to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health
and welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”).
159. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1) (mandating periodic review of NAAQS every
five years); SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 44, at 369 (“Human exposure
and/or health risk assessments and ecological risk assessments are performed
during the periodic reviews of these standards.”).
160. See supra note 26 (providing examples of criticism).
161. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–604, § 109(b)(1), 84 Stat.
1676, 1680 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012)).
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relationship between air pollution at low concentrations and adverse health effects162—so much so that by the mid-1970s, Congress expressly rejected the view that criteria pollutants have
thresholds.163
Congress’s understanding of thresholds by the time of the
1977 amendments was influenced by the National Academy of
Sciences’ (NAS) evaluation of the implementation of the 1970
Clean Air Act,164 which had been requested by the Senate Public
Works Committee.165 The report addressed in part the question
of whether the NAAQS were based on “threshold levels” and
what evidence there was of a threshold for NAAQS pollutants.166
The NAS conducted a review of existing studies on air pollutants, including several it had completed for both the Committee
162. Congress’s early acknowledgement of the threshold concept’s inapplicability to air pollutants has been discussed extensively in literature about the
Clean Air Act. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands:
The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1288–
90 (2004) (“The absence of clear thresholds for these pollutants was a wellknown fact to members of Congress during deliberations over the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, if not earlier.”); Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air Act and Carbon Dioxide, 30 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 99, 112 (2006) (“By 1977, when Congress undertook major revisions to the [Clean Air Act], it was perfectly clear that most pollutants had no
clear thresholds, and that it would therefore be impossible to set NAAQS ‘requisite to protect the public health’ without considering cost. Yet Congress chose
to maintain the fiction that thresholds exist . . . .”); Craig N. Oren, Prevention
of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA
L. REV. 1, 71 (1988) (“Judging from its frequency of citation, the apparent lack
of thresholds was considered by PSD supporters to be a powerful argument for
the program.”).
163. See, e.g., Giovinazzo, supra note 162 (noting Congress’s recognition that
pollutants had no clear thresholds).
164. See Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 162, at 1288–89 n.146 (“Congress was strongly influenced by a 1974 report prepared for the Senate by the
National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering which concluded that, contrary to the assumption underlying the 1970 Act, there were no
thresholds for criteria pollutants.”).
165. COORDINATING COMM. ON AIR QUALITY STUDIES, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS.,
AIR QUALITY AND AUTOMOBILE EMISSION CONTROL: A REPORT 22 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 NAS REPORT] (prepared for the Senate Public Works Committee)
(reviewing the Committee’s charge to NAS). According to the Committee, “[t]he
Academy was chosen as the body most likely to provide an independent and
objective study of issues relating to health effects of air pollution at a time when
the Committee found it increasingly difficult to obtain sufficient independent
and objective information through its own limited staff investigative capacity.”
Id.
166. Id. at 23. The Senate Public Works Committee asked NAS to specifically examine “(1) the adverse health effects of air pollutants, (2) the relation of
[automobile] emissions to ambient air quality, and (3) the costs and benefits
associated with control of automobile emissions.” Id. at 4.
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and for the EPA.167 The result of that effort was the NAS’s 1974
“Air Quality and Automobile Emission Control” report, which
embraced a non-threshold view of NAAQS pollutants:
The present standards were derived on the assumption that such
thresholds do exist. . . . However, in no case is there evidence that the
threshold levels have a clear physiological meaning, in the sense that
there are genuine adverse health effects at and above some level of pollution, but no effects at all below that level. On the contrary, evidence
indicates that the amount of health damage varies with the upward
and downward variations in the concentration of the pollutant, with no
sharp lower limit.168

The NAS’s guidance for the Committee was clear: “[A]t any concentration, no matter how small, health effects may occur, the
importance of which depends on the gravity of the effect.”169
Similarly, the House Committee report for the 1977 amendments emphasized that there was “neither empirical evidence
nor a theoretical basis for a threshold phenomenon” for any of
the NAAQS pollutants.170 The report, analyzing the limitations
of the NAAQS in 1976, also stated as one of its key findings: “The
national primary standards are based on the assumption that a
no-effects threshold level exists and can be proved: in fact, this
assumption of a safe threshold appears to be false.”171 The report
likewise discounted the utility of a threshold’s “margin of safety”:
From the fact that the “safe threshold” concept is, at best, a necessary
myth to permit the setting of some standards, it necessarily follows
that the margin of safety concept is also an illusion. . . . [T]he supposed
existence of even a modest (two or threefold) margin of safety is hardly
reassuring.172

167. See id. at 4 (previewing the sources used in the report).
168. Id. at 17.
169. Id. at 18. The report further noted that “[o]ther considerations also argue against accepting a threshold model of health effects literally. Even if there
were sharp threshold levels for individual persons, the levels would certainly
not be the same for different persons, or even for the same person in different
states of health.” Id. at 17. Moreover, thresholds fail to account for “synergistic
effects” of combining several pollutants, both in the human body and in the atmosphere. See id. at 18–19 (explaining the possible outcomes from the presence
of multiple pollutants). The D.C. Circuit cited NAS’s discussion of NAAQS
thresholds in its Lead Industries Ass’n v. EPA decision, one of the early legal
challenges to the 1977 amendments. See Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d
1130, 1153 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting the NAS report as countering “the
assumption that there is a discoverable no-effects threshold”).
170. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977, H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 110 (1977).
171. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1976, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1175, at 89 (1976).
172. Id. at 91.
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The House Committee report endorsed verbatim the NAS’s assertion that “it is impossible at this time to establish an ambient
air concentration for any pollutant—other than zero—below
which it is certain that no human beings will be adversely affected.”173 Even by 1976, “[t]he idea that the national primary
standards are adequate to protect the health of the public ha[d]
been belied.”174
In the floor debates leading up to 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, various members of both chambers endorsed a nonthreshold view of NAAQS contaminants.175 The bill’s chief author, Senator Edmund Muskie, emphasized a consistent theme
throughout the deliberations: “There is no threshold health effect which can be used to say that above this threshold there is
danger to health and below it there is not. The testimony before
the committee is replete over 14 years to that effect.”176 Only
173. Id. (citing NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS:
ENCE ON HEALTH EFFECTS OF AIR POLLUTION 7 (1973)).

CONFER-

174. Id.
175. Senators Muskie and Brooke, as well as Representatives Waxman, Rogers, Preyer, Maguire, and Staggers, all contested the assumption of a “safe”
threshold. See generally ENVTL. POLICY DIV., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977: A CONTINUATION OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 (1979), https://catalog
.hathitrust.org/Record/002947778 (collecting six volumes of congressional reports, floor debates, and testimony for the 1977 amendments).
176. 123 CONG. REC. 18,043 (1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie). Senator Muskie was emphatic on this point, stressing that:
Long-term, low-level exposure to pollutants produce health effects
which are not guarded against by national primary standards. We
would have to get down to zero pollution in order to eliminate all health
effects. At any level between zero pollution and the pollution permitted
by national primary standards, there are health effects.
Let us not disabuse ourselves on that score.
Id. at 18,460. Senator Muskie’s views on environmental legislation have held
particularly strong sway in the federal courts. As Professor Richard Lazarus
concluded:
Congressional intent in the context of federal environmental law may
be fairly equated with the intent of Senator Ed Muskie of Maine. Federal courts in their opinions have cited to the views of Senator Muskie
in the enactment of federal environmental statutes in at least 293 separate cases. That is an enormous number of cases. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has itself cited to Muskie’s views in fifty-four cases. . . .
Looking just to the United States Supreme Court, the statistics are
even more striking. The Justices have cited to Muskie in twenty-two
different cases. They include eight Clean Air Act cases, and eleven
Clean Water Act cases. For each of those laws, that number constitutes
a large percentage of Clean Air and Clean Water Act cases decided by
the Court.
The Senator, moreover, was cited most often by the Court majority
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seven years into the Clean Air Act regime, Senator Muskie was
unequivocal, stating that “there is no such thing as a threshold
for health effects. Even at the national primary standard level,
which is the health standard, there are health effects that are
not protected against.”177 There was evidence suggesting these
pollutants were non-threshold before the 1970 Clean Air Act was
passed, and at least some members of Congress were aware of
that issue.178 But whatever Congress believed in 1970, by 1977
Congress had determined that a non-threshold approach was
well-supported.
Importantly, the core element of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program is inconsistent with the notion
that criteria pollutants have thresholds. The PSD program constrains the degradation of ambient air quality in areas that have
air quality that is better than the NAAQS.179 If criteria pollutants had thresholds and if the NAAQS were set at these thresholds, then there would be no reason for Congress to attempt to
provide such protection. A program of this sort would have costs
but no benefits. Quite to the contrary, in establishing the PSD
program, Congress rejected the argument now being made by
opponents of the Obama Administration’s environmental regulations: that there can be no benefits from particulate reductions
below the NAAQS.180
In sum, a broad collection of evidence—advisory group reports, committee reports, floor debates, and the structure of the
legislation itself—all indicate that by 1977, Congress had rejected the threshold model for criteria pollutants. Only a few
in those cases, meaning that his views literally influenced the reasoning underlying the Court’s ruling. Seventeen different majority opinions cited to Muskie. . . . The Justices referred to the Senator as “the
principal Senate sponsor” and the “primary author” of federal environmental legislation.
Lazarus, supra note 71, at 239, 242–43 (citations omitted).
177. 123 CONG. REC. 18,460 (1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
178. In fact, Muskie asserted that Congress was aware of this issue when it
passed the original Act: “The [1970] Clean Air Act is based on the assumption,
although we knew at the time it was inaccurate, that there is a threshold.”
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: Hearing on S. 251, S. 252 and S. 253 Before
the Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollution of the S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, 95th
Cong. 8 (1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie); see also Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 162 (asserting that the Senate knew there was no threshold when it
passed the 1977 amendments, if not earlier).
179. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7473(b) (2012).
180. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text; infra notes 285–302 and
accompanying text (providing an overview of opposing views toward particulate
reduction regulations).
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years after the setting of the first standards for criteria pollutants, Congress equated “[t]he concept of a ‘no-effect’ concentration” with “a chimera.”181
B. SHIFT IN THE EPA’S APPROACH: A CASE STUDY OF LEAD
Some early EPA practices, before the 1977 amendments,
were consistent with a threshold model. However, the Agency
subsequently rejected this approach as a result of advances in
scientific understanding. In this Section, we illustrate the EPA’s
shift through a comparison of how the EPA set the NAAQS levels
for one pollutant—lead—for the first time in 1978 and how the
EPA revised these levels in 2008.
When the EPA first developed standards for criteria pollutants, the Agency treated these contaminants similarly to the
way in which it treats other noncarcinogens, using language suggesting criteria pollutants had thresholds.182 The first model developed by the EPA was used during the promulgation of the
1978 lead standard,183 which focused on finding the “safe level of
total lead exposure.”184 To find this level, the EPA employed the
“critical population, critical effects” model: identify a “critical
population” and “critical effect,” analyze the relationship between environmental exposure and the critical effect, and determine an averaging period.185 The first step of this model was to
181. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977, H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 111 (1977) (quoting 1974 NAS REPORT,
supra note 165, at 57). The report further quotes NAS’s findings that it had
“been unable to . . . prove[ ] that a threshold for nitrogen dioxide-induced injury
exists” and that “ozone is a compound like carbon monoxide for which no safe
threshold exists.” Id. (quoting 1974 NAS REPORT, supra note 165, at 41, 50).
182. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1202, 1203 n.111, 1206,
1227–28 (discussing the EPA’s use of threshold language for its earliest
NAAQS). It is worth noting that even by the 1978 Lead Rule, which as discussed
in this section included language suggestive of a threshold of health effects for
lead, the EPA acknowledged that a threshold may not, in fact, exist. “It is also
true that the absence of statistical correlation of EP levels with blood lead levels
below 15 μg Pb/dL does not necessarily mean that these lower blood lead levels
are known to be without risk.” Lead: Proposed National Primary and Secondary
Ambient Air Quality Standards, 42 Fed. Reg. 63,076, 63,079 (proposed Dec. 14,
1977) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) [hereinafter 1977 Lead Proposed Rule].
183. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1211.
184. 1977 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 182. A “safe level” assumes that
there is a threshold; by definition, a threshold is a level below which there are
no health effects. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. For a more detailed
discussion of how the EPA set the 1978 lead standard, see Livermore & Revesz,
supra note 74, at 1202–06.
185. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1211 (explaining the “critical-population-critical-effect” framework as applied to lead).
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identify the critical population, a particularly vulnerable segment of the population that differed depending on the pollutant
and the type of harm posed.186 The EPA chose young children
ages one to five as the critical population for lead, both because
young children are more susceptible to adverse health effects at
lower exposure levels than adults, and because children are at
higher risk of exposure to lead through dirt and soil.187 The EPA
noted that children are at greater risk because of higher intake
of lead per unit of body weight, greater absorption and retention
of ingested lead, physiologic stresses due to rapid growth and dietary habits, incomplete development of metabolic defense
mechanisms, and greater sensitivity of developing systems.188
The EPA acknowledged that there were other potential critical
populations, notably pregnant women and fetuses, but stated
that there was no available evidence to indicate that this population would require more stringent standards than small children.189
The critical effect is defined by the EPA as “the first adverse
effect, or its known precursor” which occurs in the critical population.190 The EPA identified lead-induced elevation of erythrocyte protoporphyrin (EP) elevation as the critical effect.191 EP elevation is limited iron absorption in red blood cells that can be
caused by exposure to lead.192 The EPA noted that EP elevation
causes impairment of cell functions which should not, in the
Agency’s view, be permitted to persist as a chronic condition.193
In 1978, the EPA reasoned that if the most sensitive population was protected, everyone else would be protected as well.194
186. See id.
187. See 1977 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 182, at 63,077–78 (“EPA believes that young children (ages 1–5 years) should be regarded as the foremost
critically sensitive population for setting the lead standard.”).
188. Id. at 63,078.
189. Id.
190. Risk Assessment for Other Effects, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/fera/risk-assessment-other-effects (last updated Jan. 31,
2017).
191. See 1977 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 182, at 63,078 (“EPA is proposing that lead-induced elevation in children of EP should be accepted as the
pivotal adverse effect of lead.”).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards
for Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246, 46,250, 46,252, 46,254 (Oct. 5, 1978) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) [hereinafter 1978 Lead Final Rule] (reasoning that the
proposed standard will protect adults in part because “children are known to
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Moreover, if the critical population was protected against the
critical effect, then everyone would be protected against every
effect of the pollutant.195 After making these two determinations,
the EPA established a relationship between environmental exposure and the critical effect of EP elevation. The Agency first
determined the blood lead level at which children ages one to five
would experience EP elevation. The EPA selected 30 μg/dL as
the “maximum safe blood level for an individual child.”196 This
was the individual threshold of risk for children established by
the Center for Disease Control (CDC) at that time.197 The EPA
then selected 15 μg/dL as the average blood level target, reasoning that at that level 99.5% of the population of children would
have blood levels below the 30 μg/dL level.198
The EPA then attempted to account for non-air sources of
lead, which are much more significant than airborne lead pollution and include lead paint, which may be ingested by small children.199 Studies examined by the EPA suggested non-air pollution to be from 10.2 μg/dL to as much as 14.4 μg/dL,200 from
which the Agency estimated a contribution of 12 μg/dL.201 The
EPA then subtracted the non-air contributions from its target
average blood level of 15 μg/dL, leading to a permissible air contribution of 3 μg/dL.202

have greater net absorption and retention of lead than adults”); see also Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1203.
195. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1203.
196. 1978 Lead Final Rule, supra note 194, at 46,253.
197. 1977 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 182, at 63,079 (“[I]n 1975 the Center for Disease Control established as a guideline for undue or increased lead
absorption in children a blood lead level of 30 μg Pb/dL or EP levels of 60
μg/dL.”).
198. See id. Despite its use of a threshold model, the EPA effectively opted
to leave more than 20,000 children unprotected and likely subjected to lead levels above 30 μg/dL in their blood. See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at
1207 (citing to 1978 Lead Final Rule, supra note 194, at 46,255). Thus, even
when the Agency tried to set a threshold standard, it knowingly failed to set
that standard at a level below which no adverse health effects occurred.
199. See 1978 Lead Final Rule, supra note 194, at 46,253–54 (discussing the
rulemaking approach for non-air sources of lead exposure).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 46,254. One consequence of selecting the 12 μg/dL estimate for
contribution was that individuals living in areas of the country in which nonair contribution exceeded 12 μg/dL were left unprotected by the threshold that
the EPA ultimately chose. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1207–08.
202. See 1978 Lead Final Rule, supra note 194, at 46,254; 1977 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 182, at 63,081 (showing the EPA calculations).
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The EPA then needed to translate the target level of lead in
blood into a limitation on lead in air, which is what the NAAQS
regulate. To do so, the EPA estimated the ratio of lead in air to
lead in blood. Finally, the Agency divided the air-to-blood ratio
it had selected by two.203 The final standard set was a maximum
allowable concentration of lead in the air of 1.5 μg/m3.204
In 2008, the EPA under President George W. Bush revisited
its 1978 lead NAAQS determination and revised the standard
from 1.5 μg/m3 to one tenth that amount; 0.15 μg/m3.205 New epidemiological research on the effects of even very low blood lead
levels on intelligence quotient (IQ) convinced EPA officials to
lower NAAQS for lead.206 By 2008, there was broad consensus in
the scientific community that these effects were among the most
sensitive of lead’s harms and of the greatest public concern.207
Though the EPA focused on loss of IQ points, the EPA eliminated
the “critical effect” language.208
In evaluating potential lead limits, the EPA focused on
measurements of lead in urban areas209 where lead pollution and
lead exposure is generally higher.210 The EPA chose three urban
case studies: Cleveland, Chicago, and Los Angeles to measure
ambient air quality.211 The EPA also included a “general urban
203. See 1978 Lead Final Rule, supra note 194, at 46,252, 46,254 (“On the
basis of an estimated relationship of air lead to blood lead of 1 to 2, EPA concludes that the ambient air standard should be 1.5 μg/m3.”); 1977 Lead Proposed
Rule, supra note 182, at 63,081.
204. 1978 Lead Final Rule, supra note 194, at 46,246 (“EPA is setting a national ambient air quality standard for lead at a level of 1.5 micrograms lead
per cubic meter of air (μg Pb/m3), averaged over a calendar quarter.”).
205. See 2008 Final Rule National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Lead,
73 Fed. Reg. 66,964, 66,966 (Nov. 12, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50,
51, 53, and 58) [hereinafter 2008 Lead Final Rule].
206. See GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, LEAD WARS: THE POLITICS
OF SCIENCE AND THE FATE OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN 96–121 (2013) (tracking the
emergence and acceptance of research showing negative impacts on IQ at low
lead blood levels despite lead industry interference).
207. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Lead, 73 Fed. Reg.
29,184, 29,198 (proposed May 20, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51,
53, and 58) [hereinafter 2008 Lead Proposed Rule] (referring to neurological effects as being “currently clearly of greatest public health concern”).
208. See id. at 29,198–207.
209. See id. at 29,208 (“EPA . . . focused on characterizing risk for residential
populations in three specific urban locations.”).
210. Ronnie Levin et al., Lead Exposures in U.S. Children, 2008: Implications for Prevention, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1285, 1289 (2008), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2569084/pdf/ehp-116-1285.pdf (“Lead
contamination typically is greater in urban versus rural areas.”).
211. 2008 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 207, at 29,210.
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case study,” not based on a specific geographic area, but using
simplifications to represent exposure of children in small residential areas near the current NAAQS.212 Finally, the EPA included a “primary Pb smelter case study,” based on a specific
area not currently in compliance with NAAQS.213 The Agency
analyzed each of these cases under alternative NAAQS, including the current standard, and calculated the median blood level
associated with each scenario.214 To convert each ambient air
standard into a distribution of blood levels in children, the EPA
used two models that incorporated air, soil, and indoor dust estimations for each case study and separated sources of blood
level into non-air related, “recent air,” including ingesting ambient air and dust recently carried into the home, and “past air,”
including sources less immediately affected by a standard
change, like ingesting outdoor soil and dust.215 For each blood
level estimated as a result of a particular NAAQS scenario, the
EPA attempted to estimate what percentage of the blood level
was attributable to air sources, with the lower bound of the estimate including only recent air sources and the upper bound including recent and past air sources.216
The EPA then needed to translate blood levels into lost IQ
points. The EPA noted that “the slope for effects on IQ is steeper
at lower blood lead levels,”217 meaning that one additional unit
of exposure at low levels has a greater health effect than one additional unit at higher levels. The EPA suggested that one possible reason for this is that lead at low exposures might interfere
with different biological mechanisms than lead at higher exposures, and the mechanisms affected at lower levels might be
more easily saturated.218
Across the case study locations, at the then-current standard of 1.5 μg/m3, the model showed a median loss of more than
212. Id. at 29,209.
213. Id. at 29,209–10.
214. See id. at 29,216–17, 29,217 tbl.3 (summarizing the results of simulations with different NAAQS levels).
215. Id. at 29,210–11.
216. See id. at 29,215 tbl.2 (summarizing the air-related percentage of lead
in blood levels across different potential NAAQS levels).
217. Id. at 29,201.
218. See NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT RTP DIV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA/600/R-5/144aF, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR LEAD, at 8-66 (2006),
http://ofmpub.epa.gov/eims/eimscomm.getfile?p_download_id=459555 (“It is
conceivable that . . . lower Pb levels may be disrupting different biological mechanisms than the more severe levels of high exposures . . . .”).
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two IQ points, and an upper bound of four or more IQ points
lost.219 This is not a small risk: because this figure measures a
median loss, the actual loss for certain individuals at the high
end of the distribution could be much greater.220 The EPA also
estimated the number of children in Cleveland, Chicago, and Los
Angeles likely to lose between one and seven IQ points under the
1978 NAAQS regime, still in place at the time.221 One model predicted 395,528 children in Chicago, 13,857 in Cleveland, and
284,945 in Los Angeles would lose more than one IQ point.222
According to the same model, in Chicago, 100,159 children were
estimated to lose more than seven IQ points; in Cleveland, 1858
children would suffer such losses; as would 57,834 children in
Los Angeles.223 As a result of the existing studies and risk assessment, the Administrator determined the current standard
did not protect public health with an adequate margin of
safety.224
Reviewing this data, a panel of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC), a non-partisan entity tasked with
providing independent scientific advice to the EPA,225 advised
219. 2008 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 207, at 29,217.
220. See id. at 29,195 (“While levels in the U.S. general population, including
geometric mean levels in children aged 1–5, have declined significantly, levels
have been found to vary among children of different socioeconomic status . . . and other demographic characteristics. . . . For example, while the
2001–2004 median blood level for children aged 1–5 of all races and ethnic
groups is 1.6 μg/dL, the median for the subset living below the poverty level is
2.3 μg/dL and 90th percentile values for these two groups are 4.0 μg/dL and 5.4
μg/dL, respectively. Similarly, the 2001–2004 median blood level for black, nonHispanic children aged 1–5 is 2.5 μg/dL, while the median level for the subset
of that group living below the poverty level is 2.9 μg/dL and the median level for
the subset living in more well-off households (i.e., with income more than 200%
of the poverty level) is 1.9 μg/dL. Associated 90th percentile values for 2001–
2004 are 6.4 μg/dL (for black, non-Hispanic children aged 1–5), 7.7 μg/dL (for
the subset of that group living below the poverty level) and 4.1 μg/dL (for the
subset living in a household with income more than 200% of the poverty level).”).
221. Id. at 29,219–20 tbls.4, 5 & 6.
222. Id. at 29,219–20 tbl.5 (employing a log-linear model).
223. Id. at 29,220 tbl.6.
224. Id. at 29,229.
225. CASAC was established as part of the 1977 amendments “to review the
criteria and standards promulgated [by the EPA], and provide other related scientific and technical advice.” EPA Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC): Charter, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (June 5, 2015), https://
yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/WebCASAC/currentcharter?
OpenDocument. By statute, CASAC is composed of seven members appointed
by the EPA Administrator, “including at least one member of the National Academy of Sciences, one physician, and one person representing State air pollution
control agencies.” Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(A) (2012).
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the EPA that a population IQ loss of one to two points represented a “highly significant” public health loss226 and advised a
standard “no higher than 0.2 μg/m3.”227 Using the air-to-blood
ratio and the concentration-response function, the Administrator determined in the final rule that 0.15 μg/m3 would result in
a mean IQ loss within the subset population below two points.228
Between 1978 and 2008, the EPA’s analysis shifted significantly with regard to the issue of thresholds.229 In 1978, the EPA
adopted the CDC’s threshold of 30 μg/dL as the “maximum safe
blood lead level.”230 The Agency’s next steps were all premised
on the assumption that so long as a child’s blood level remained
below this limit, adverse health effects would be avoided. In the
EPA’s 2008 revision for lead, this premise was no longer valid as
a result of new epidemiological studies about lead’s effects at low
doses.231 The proposed rule explicitly stated that “the Administrator recognizes that [lead] can be considered a non-threshold
pollutant.”232 Moreover, the EPA noted in 2008 that the CDC
recognized that no “safe” threshold for blood lead has been identified,233 and stated that “[t]hreshold levels, in terms of blood
[lead] levels in individual children, for neurological effects cannot be discerned from the currently available studies.”234 The
Agency acknowledged that there are effects from lead at very low

226. 2008 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 207, at 29,226.
227. Id. at 29,241.
228. 2008 Lead Final Rule, supra note 205, at 67,005–06. Note that the proposed rule modeled the median loss of IQ points, whereas the final rule modeled
the mean loss of IQ points. Compare 2008 Lead Final Rule, supra note 205, at
67,005 tbl.4 (showing mean IQ loss), with 2008 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note
207, at 29,218 tbl.4 (showing median IQ loss).
229. Though the 2008 method represents a significant shift, there are still
concerns about this analysis. For a brief overview, see Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1214. The most significant issue is that the population IQ loss of
one to two points is rather arbitrary. Id.
230. 1978 Lead Final Rule, supra note 194, at 46,253.
231. See MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, supra note 206, at 111–20.
232. 2008 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 207, at 29,244. This claim is reiterated in the final rule, albeit qualified by the possibility that thresholds may
still exist “at levels distinctly lower than the lowest exposures examined in these
epidemiological studies.” 2008 Lead Final Rule, supra note 205, at 66,984.
233. 2008 Lead Final Rule, supra note 205, at 66,972.
234. Id. at 66,975.
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levels,235 and even asserted that the slope for effects on IQ is actually steeper at lower blood lead levels.236 Further, though the
EPA based the final steps of its analysis around the significant
health effect of loss of one to two IQ points, the Agency did not
claim that this was a level below which there are no health
risks.237 The Administrator even acknowledged that standards
would ideally be set so that no children would lose IQ points due
to lead pollution.238 The rule’s Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA),
which examines the “the potential social benefits and social costs
of a regulation,”239 effectively reaffirmed these conclusions:
while the EPA ultimately adopted an updated standard of 0.15
μg/m3, it had also analyzed the costs and benefits of a more stringent standard of 0.10 μg/m3,240 and found additional total benefits from moving to a 0.15 μg/m3 level to a 0.10 μg/m3 level to be
between $1.1 billion and $1.7 billion.241 These are benefits that
would not exist below a true threshold. The EPA acknowledged
that the decision was ultimately a “public health policy judgment” because there is no “evidence- or risk-based bright line
that indicates a single appropriate level.”242 Overall, this 2008

235. Id. at 66,992 n.68. The EPA “recognizes today that ‘there is no level of
[lead] exposure that can yet be identified, with confidence, as clearly not being
associated with some risk of deleterious health effects.’” Id. (quoting 2006 Criteria Document, at 8-63).
236. Id. at 66,987.
237. See id. at 66,998; 2008 Lead Proposed Rule, supra note 207, at 29,243.
238. Id. at 29,242.
239. Regulatory Impact Analyses for Air Pollution Regulations, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/economic-and-cost-analysis-air
-pollution-regulations/regulatory-impact-analyses-air-pollution (last updated
Sept. 11, 2018). The Agency’s RIAs include descriptions of social costs and benefits “that cannot be quantified in monetary terms and a determination of the
potential net benefits of the rule[,] including an evaluation of the effects that
are not monetarily quantified.” Id.
240. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR
LEAD, at ES-1 to -7 (2008), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-lead_
ria_final_2008-10.pdf.
241. Id. at 5-2. This number is the difference between the low estimate for
the 0.10 μg/m3 level and the 0.15 μg/m3 level and the difference between the
high estimates at those levels. Both estimates are calculated using a 3% discount rate, though the EPA also calculates benefits and costs using a 7% discount rate. Id. However, economists generally find the 7% rate to be unrealistically high for air pollution estimates. See Newell, supra note 9. The benefits
discussed in this section were all calculated using the 3% discount rate unless
otherwise noted.
242. 2008 Lead Final Rule, supra note 205, at 67,006.
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rulemaking reflected an important shift in how the EPA regulates NAAQS pollutants: from assuming that there is a threshold
below which no health effects will occur to acknowledging that
the decision is ultimately a policy judgment because there is no
exposure level where all risks can be avoided.243
C. REJECTING THRESHOLDS AND CALCULATING BENEFITS
BELOW THE NAAQS
The EPA’s rejection of thresholds for lead is not atypical.
Across the range of criteria pollutants, the EPA has moved toward a non-threshold model. For many criteria pollutants, the
EPA has explicitly acknowledged—in some cases for decades—
where it has evidence to suggest that NAAQS pollutants lack a
threshold. Further, for all but one of the criteria pollutants,244
the Agency has calculated benefits from alternatives more stringent than what the EPA ultimately selected as its standard, and

243. In 2016, the EPA again reviewed the lead NAAQS and declined to adjust the standard, leaving in place the 0.15 μg/m3 level. The Agency noted that
newly available evidence “reaffirms conclusions” from the 2008 NAAQS and
stated that the “currently available evidence is generally consistent with the
evidence available in the last review.” Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Lead, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,906, 71,907 (Oct. 18, 2016) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). The Agency also reiterated that the NAAQS were not a norisk threshold. Id. at 71,929. In reviewing the 2008 standard, the EPA “recogniz[ed] the continued lack of a discernible threshold of exposure associated with
neurocognitive effects.” Id. Moreover, the Administrator, responding to comments that there is no safe level of lead exposure, instead noted that she was
not required by the Clean Air Act to establish a NAAQS with zero risk. Id. at
71,928; see also Joseph M. Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and Air Quality
Standards, 24 ENVTL. L. 821, 824–25, 837 (1994) (“The absence of health or
welfare thresholds is well-known not only to scientists but also to Congress,
EPA, and the courts, which are often called on to oversee EPA’s implementation
of the Act. Nonetheless, attempts to deal rationally with the problems of air
pollution are frustrated because the threshold assumption is built into the
structure of the Act. . . . While recognizing that health-effects thresholds may
not exist for some pollutants, EPA has nonetheless generally structured its
NAAQS rulemakings as if they do.”(citations omitted)).
244. The EPA found benefits for every criteria pollutant for which it has performed an RIA in recent times. The sole exception is carbon monoxide: the
Agency reviewed the carbon monoxide NAAQS in 2011, but did not conduct an
RIA. See Review of National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Carbon Monoxide, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,294 (Aug. 31, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50,
53, and 58) [hereinafter 2011 Carbon Monoxide Review]. The most recent RIA
for carbon monoxide was conducted in 1985. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
EPA-450/5-85-007, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL AMBIENT
AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR CARBON MONOXIDE (1985), http://nepis.epa.gov/
Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=2000NK80.TXT.
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it has done so under presidents from both parties.245 That the
EPA finds additional benefits for levels more stringent than the
NAAQS is inconsistent with the existence of a threshold for
these pollutants: below a threshold there should be no additional
benefits from reductions. This section surveys the EPA’s historical practices for ozone, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, and
sulfur dioxide,246 revealing the Agency’s consistent calculations
of benefits below NAAQS levels and its more explicit finding on
the lack of evidence of thresholds. A similar analysis for particulates follows in Part III.
As early as 1979, the EPA began to acknowledge the difficulty of identifying thresholds for criteria pollutants. In its revision for ozone, the Carter EPA noted that the rule’s “criteria document supports the contention that a clear threshold of adverse
health effects cannot be identified with certainty for ozone.”247 In
revising that standard, the George H.W. Bush EPA concluded
that “[t]here appears to be no threshold level below which materials damage will not occur; exposure of sensitive materials to
any non-zero concentration of O3 (including natural background
levels) can produce effects if the exposure duration is sufficiently
long.”248 In its 1997 review for ozone, the Clinton EPA went even
further. The Agency recognized “O3 may elicit a continuum of
biological responses down to background concentrations.”249 In
stark terms, the Agency noted that, “in the absence of any discernible threshold, it is not possible to select a level below which
245. These calculations are part of the EPA’s efforts to comply with Executive Order 12,866, issued during the Clinton Administration, and OMB Circular
A-4, issued during the George W. Bush Administration. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (RIA) FOR THE NO2 NATIONAL
AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS (NAAQS), at ES-2 (2010), https://www3
.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-no2_ria_final_2010-01.pdf (discussing these
documents as presenting “guidelines for EPA to assess the benefits and costs of
the selected regulatory option, as well as one less stringent and one more stringent option”).
246. The additional benefits for more stringent lead standards were discussed as part of the case study supra Part II.B, while the benefits for additional
particulate matter reductions are discussed in depth infra Part III.
247. Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Photochemical Oxidants, 44 Fed. Reg. 8202, 8213 (Feb. 8, 1979) (“Rather, there is a
continuum consisting of ozone levels at which health effects are certain, through
levels at which scientists can generally agree that health effects have been
clearly demonstrated, and down to levels at which the indications of health effects are less certain and harder to identify.”).
248. Proposed Rule for National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone,
57 Fed. Reg. 35,542, 35,553 (Aug. 10, 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
249. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg.
38,856, 38,863 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
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absolutely no effects are likely to occur . . . [or] to identify a level
at which it can be concluded with confidence that no ‘adverse’
effects are likely to occur.”250 In 2008, the George W. Bush EPA’s
final rule for ozone repeatedly confirmed that “the underlying
scientific evidence is [not] certain enough to support a focus on
any single bright-line benchmark level.”251 The rule’s RIA explicitly noted that “ozone is a non-threshold pollutant.”252 In 2015,
the EPA under President Obama noted in its final rule for ozone
that “[f]rom the inception of the NAAQS standard-setting process, the EPA and the courts have acknowledged that scientific
uncertainties in general, and the lack of clear thresholds in pollutant effects in particular, preclude any [] definitive determinations [of zero risk standards].”253 Similarly, the rule’s Integrated
Science Assessment stated more explicitly the Agency’s “overall
conclusion[] that the epidemiologic studies . . . indicated a generally linear [concentration-response] function with no indication of a threshold . . . .”254
The EPA in 2008 also included benefits calculations for levels below the standard set by the regulation. While the EPA selected a standard of 0.075 ppm, the Agency also analyzed a more
stringent standard of 0.070 ppm—the level later selected by the
Obama Administration in 2015—as well as an even more stringent 0.065 ppm standard.255 The Agency provided third-party estimates of benefits for its chosen standard of 0.075 ppm which
ranged from $2 billion to $19 billion in 2020.256 For a more stringent standard of 0.070 ppm, the Agency estimated benefits of
250. Id.
251. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg.
16,436, 16,465, 16,471, 16,476–77, 16,481–82 (Mar. 27, 2008) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pts. 50 and 58). Moreover, the rule noted that, in light of the continuum of effects associated with varying levels of exposure to ozone, adverse
health effects are “related to the actual magnitude of the O3 concentration, not
just whether the concentration is above a specified level.” Id. at 16,475. The
Administrator recognized “that exposures of concern must be considered in the
context of a continuum of the potential for health effects of concern, and their
severity, with increasing uncertainty associated with the likelihood of such effects at lower O3 exposure levels.” Id. at 16,465–66.
252. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL OZONE NAAQS REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, at 6-30 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 FINAL OZONE RIA],
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-o3_ria_final_2008-03.pdf.
253. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 80 Fed. Reg.
65,292, 65,355 (Oct. 26, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 52, 53, and
58).
254. Id. at 65,309.
255. 2008 FINAL OZONE RIA, supra note 252, at ES-1.
256. Id. at 7-3 tbl.7.1a.
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$3.5 billion to $36 billion.257 For the most stringent standard of
0.065 ppm, the EPA included estimates of benefits ranging from
$5.5 billion to $58 billion in 2020.258
In its 2015 RIA, the EPA again calculated benefits for reductions in ozone below its chosen NAAQS level. In the RIA analyzing a revision of the secondary standard for ozone from 75 to 70
parts per billion (ppb),259 the EPA provided an analysis of the
benefits of a 70 ppb standard and an alternative of 65 ppb.260 The
Agency estimated the benefits of the 70 ppb level to be between
$2.9 and $5.9 billion in 2025, and the benefits of a 65 ppb level
to be between $15 and $30 billion over the same period.261 Further, the Agency found that in 2025, the 70 ppb standard would
prevent between 96 and 160 ozone-related premature deaths and
220 to 500 particulate matter-related premature deaths.262 However, the 65 ppb level would prevent between 490 and 820 ozonerelated deaths and between 1100 and 2500 particulate matterrelated deaths.263
In its 1985 revision for nitrogen dioxide, the Reagan EPA
asserted a qualified rejection of NO2 thresholds, stating that
“none of the evidence presented in the Criteria Document shows
a clear threshold of adverse health effects for NO2.”264 As it had
done six years earlier with ozone, the Agency described adverse
health effects from nitrogen dioxide exposure as occupying “a
continuum, ranging from NO2 levels at which health effects are
undisputed, through levels at which many, but not all scientists
generally agree that health effects have been convincingly
shown, down to levels at which the indications of health effects

257. Id. at 7-3 tbl.7.1c.
258. Id. at 7-4 tbl.7.1d.
259. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-15-007, REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL REVISIONS TO THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY
STANDARDS FOR GROUND-LEVEL OZONE, at 1-1 (2015), https://www3.epa.gov/
ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-o3_ria_final_2015-09.pdf. The standard was set with an
averaging time of eight hours and the form of annual fourth-highest daily maximum averaged over three years. Id.
260. Id. at ES-2.
261. Id. at ES-15 tbl.ES-5. These figures were calculated at a 7% discount
rate as the EPA only summarized benefits at the 7% discount rate. Id.
262. Id. at ES-16 tbl.ES-6.
263. Id. at ES-16 tbl.ES-6.
264. Retention of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Nitrogen
Dioxide, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,532, 25,537 (June 19, 1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 50).
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are less certain and more difficult to identify.”265 In the 2010 update to that standard, the Obama EPA noted that “[t]his metaanalysis does not provide any evidence of a threshold below
which effects do not occur.”266 The revision’s Integrated Science
Assessment also “concluded that NO2 epidemiologic studies provide ‘little evidence of any effect threshold’” and that “concentration-response relationships . . . appear linear.”267 That 2010 review prompted the EPA to set a new short-term NO2 standard of
100 ppb, based on the three-year average of the 98th percentile
of one-hour daily maximum concentrations.268
The Agency in 2010 also found additional benefits for reductions in nitrogen dioxide below NAAQS levels. In addition to its
100 ppb standard, the EPA also analyzed a lower, more stringent
level of 80 ppb.269 At and above 100 ppb, according to the controlled human exposure studies, increased airway responsiveness was observed in “a large percentage of asthmatics.”270 However, the EPA acknowledged that people with more severe
asthma would be expected to experience symptoms at concentrations below the 100 ppb standard.271 The Agency calculated that
an 80 ppb standard would have an additional $3.2 to $8.6 million
in benefits in 2020 over the 100 ppb standard that the EPA
chose.272
The primary sulfur dioxide NAAQS standard was most recently revised under the Obama Administration in 2010. The final rule recognized that “the available health effects evidence
reflects a continuum consisting of ambient levels of SO2 at which
265. Id. The Agency went on to note that there was uncertainty, acknowledging that based on evidence available at the time, “[t]his does not necessarily
mean that there is no threshold, other than zero, for NO2 related health effects;
it simply means no precise threshold can be identified with certainty based on
existing medical evidence.” Id.
266. Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Nitrogen Dioxide,
75 Fed. Reg. 6474, 6500 (Feb. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50 and
58).
267. Id. at 6480. For further discussion of the EPA’s acknowledgment of scientific “uncertainty” of thresholds, see infra Part III.C.
268. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
(RIA) FOR THE NO2 NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS (NAAQS), at
ES-1 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 FINAL NO2 RIA], https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/
docs/ria/naaqs-no2_ria_final_2010-01.pdf.
269. Id.
270. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 74, at 1218.
271. Id.
272. 2010 FINAL NO2 RIA, supra note 268, at ES-6 tbl.ES-1, ES-7 tbl.ES-2.
This is at the 65% gradient, which was the level the EPA chose in its final regulation. Id.
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scientists generally agree that health effects are likely to occur,
through lower levels at which the likelihood and magnitude of
the response become increasingly uncertain.”273
As part of these regulations, the EPA set a new standard of
75 ppb, based on the three-year average of the 99th percentile of
one-hour daily maximum concentrations,274 but also analyzed alternative primary standards of 50 ppb.275 At the 75 ppb level, the
EPA found $2.2 million in benefits, including 260 fewer emergency room visits for respiratory symptoms.276 At the lower 50
ppb level, the EPA calculated $8.5 million in benefits, including
930 fewer such emergency room visits.277 The Agency also calculated that a 50 ppb standard could have yielded as much as $46
billion in additional PM2.5 co-benefits compared to the 75 ppb
standard.278
In its 2011 revision for carbon monoxide, the Obama EPA
recognized carbon monoxide pollution as similarly exhibiting a
“continuum” of adverse health effects with varying degrees of
certainty.279 The Agency highlighted two studies that were unable to discern a threshold for cardiovascular effects from carbon
monoxide exposure.280 The rule’s Integrated Science Assessment
273. Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Sulfur Dioxide, 75
Fed. Reg. 35,520, 35,529 (June 22, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 53,
and 58).
274. Id. at 35,524.
275. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS
(RIA) FOR THE SO2 NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS (NAAQS), at
ES-1 (2010), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-so2_ria_final_2010
-06.pdf.
276. Id. at 5-20, 5-21 tbl.5.5 (showing figures that represent “the incidences
of health effects and monetized benefits of attaining the alternative standard
levels by health endpoint. Because all health effects from SO2 exposure are expected to occur within the analysis year, the monetized benefits for SO2 [for
these figures] do not need to be discounted. Please note that these benefits do
not include any of the benefits listed as ‘unquantified’ . . . nor do they include
the PM co-benefits . . . .”).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 5-31 (comparing estimates in particulate matter co-benefits calculated in the Laden study, using a 3% discount rate).
279. 2011 Carbon Monoxide Review, supra note 244, at 54,308 (“These judgments are informed by the recognition that the available health effects evidence
generally reflects a continuum, consisting of ambient levels at which scientists
generally agree that health effects are likely to occur, through lower levels at
which the likelihood and magnitude of the response become increasingly uncertain.”).
280. Id. at 54,300 (“Among the controlled human exposure studies, the ISA
places principal emphasis on the study of CAD patients by Allred et al. (1989a,
1989b, 1991) (which was also considered in the previous review) for the follow-
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concluded that “[e]pidemiologic analyses investigating the exposure-response relationship for mortality and cardiovascular
morbidity did not find evidence for a departure from linearity or
a threshold for CO effects.”281
In short, the EPA has moved away from the “critical effect”
language it originally developed for NAAQS pollutants in 1978
and which might have suggested a threshold,282 and since the
late 1970s has openly rejected the threshold assumption for criteria pollutants on the basis of advances in the scientific understanding. The EPA also calculates benefits for criteria pollutant
reductions below the levels the Agency chose for each of the most
recent NAAQS.283 All of this is flatly inconsistent with the notion, advanced by the Trump Administration and by other opponents of Obama-era regulations in litigation,284 that the NAAQS
represent a no-harm threshold for criteria pollutants, and that
Obama-era rules inflated benefits in ways inconsistent with historical EPA practices.
III. CALCULATING HEALTH BENEFITS FROM
PARTICULATE MATTER REDUCTIONS BELOW THE
NAAQS
Critics of climate change regulations argue that particulate
reduction benefits do not exist below the NAAQS, which they
characterize as a no-harm threshold.285 According to adherents
of this view, “[b]oth theory and data suggest that thresholds exist below which further reductions in exposure to PM2.5 do not
yield changes in mortality response and that one should expect
ing reasons: (1) Dose-response relationships were observed; (2) effects were observed at the lowest COHb levels tested (mean of 2–2.4% COHb following experimental CO exposure), with no evidence of a threshold.” (citations omitted)).
The EPA later in the same section on “Cardiovascular Effects” notes that “an
important finding of the multilaboratory study was the dose-response relationship observed between COHb and the markers of myocardial ischemia, with effects observed at the lowest increases in COHb tested, without evidence of a
measurable threshold effect.” Id.
281. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/R-09/019F, INTEGRATED SCIENCE
ASSESSMENT FOR CARBON MONOXIDE, at 2-16 (2010), http://ofmpub.epa.gov/
eims/eimscomm.getfile?p_download_id=494432.
282. See supra notes 185–95 and accompanying text; supra notes 207–08 and
accompanying text.
283. Note that the EPA did not calculate benefits for carbon monoxide, the
lone exception to this pattern, as the EPA did not produce a new RIA. See supra
note 139.
284. See supra notes 30–38. Moreover, this argument is not supported for
particulate matter. See infra notes 409–25 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 26.
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diminishing returns as exposures are reduced to lower and lower
levels.”286 Similarly, the Heartland Institute, which bills itself as
“the world’s most prominent think tank supporting skepticism
about man-made climate change,”287 advocates that there is a
“widely held belief among scientists and health experts, supported by ample research, that some threshold must exist below
which pollution has no health impact. That belief is often summarized as ‘[t]he dose makes the poison.’”288 More recently, it has
deemed PM2.5 a “favorite new bogeyman” of the EPA, calling it a
“fabricate[d] . . . disease entity . . . [of] post-modern pseudo-science.”289 The National Mining Association advances the same
line of reasoning in Michigan v. EPA in its challenge to the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards:
EPA concedes that most of these benefits supposedly result from reducing [particulate matter] concentrations to below the level that EPA set
in its PM2.5 NAAQS . . . . But EPA set the [particulate matter] NAAQS,
as it set all of the NAAQS, at a level that is “requisite to protect the
public health” with a margin of safety and without considering compliance costs.290

286. Susan E. Dudley, OMB’s Reported Benefits of Regulation: Too Good To
Be True?, 36 REG. 26, 28 (2013), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/
serials/files/regulation/2013/6/regulation-v36n2-4.pdf.
287. Arthur B. Robinson Center on Climate and Environmental Policy:
About, HEARTLAND INST., https://www.heartland.org/Center-Climate
-Environment/About/index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
288. Jay Lehr, Warning: New HEI Report on PM10 Easy to Misinterpret,
HEARTLAND INST. (June 17, 2004), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/
news/warning-new-hei-report-on-pm10-easy-to-misinterpret?source=policybot;
see also Paul Driessen, EPA’s Dangerous Regulatory Pollution, HEARTLAND
INST. (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/epas
-dangerous-regulatory-pollution (“How can it be that PM2.5 particulates are dangerous or lethal for Americans in general, every time they step outside—but
harmless to human guinea pigs [in EPA experiments] who were intentionally
administered pollution dozens of times worse than what they would encounter
outdoors? How can it be, as EPA-funded researchers now assert, that ‘acute,
transient responses seen in clinical studies cannot necessarily be used to predict
health effects of chronic or repeated exposure’—when that is precisely what
EPA claims they can and do show?”). The Heartland Institute now asserts that
the EPA’s PM2.5 science constitutes “an attempted takeover of absolutely all industry in the United States,” despite “[t]he best scientific research show[ing]
these particles are ubiquitous and, contrary to EPA’s claims, . . . harmless.” H.
Sterling Burnett, EPA Air Quality Research, Regulations Flawed, Study Finds,
HEARTLAND INST. (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/
news/epa-air-quality-research-regulations-flawed-study-finds.
289. Charles Battig, Driving Policies Through Fraud and Fear-Mongering,
HEARTLAND INST. (July 10, 2015), https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/
news/driving-policies-through-fraud-and-fear-mongering?source=policybot.
290. Opening Brief of Petitioner the National Mining Ass’n at 41 n.19, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (No. 14-46) (citations omitted) (quoting 42
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In other words, the National Mining Association asserts that if
the EPA followed its mandate to regulate particulate matter to
the extent required under the NAAQS regime, then there would
be no benefits below the NAAQS standard because the NAAQS
standard would be set at the point at which benefits would not
accrue below it.291 Either, it claims, the EPA has not appropriately set the particulate matter NAAQS standard with the requisite margin of safety, or the asserted co-benefits of particulate
matter reduction are nonexistent.292
Opponents also challenge the science underlying the EPA’s
calculation of additional benefits from pollution reduction below
the NAAQS. The EPA’s use of a linear, non-threshold approach
for low-level particulate matter concentrations293 has been criticized as “highly imprecise” and guilty of “cherrypicking” epidemiology studies en route to a “biased assessment of the available
data.”294 Moreover, the EPA’s assertion of benefits from particulate matter have been deemed “[i]llusory”;295 based on “empty
generalities and speculative claims”;296 “based on questionable
assumptions and . . . likely overstated”;297 “specious”;298 and “employ[ing] a methodology that places a thumb on the scale at every
step of its benefit calculations and that regularly eschews real
data in place of unrealistic assumptions and wild speculations.”299 These purported benefits are allegedly “vague[,] unmonetized,”300 and “too speculative,”301 with the implication that
if benefits are too uncertain to be quantified, they are too uncer-

U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012)).
291. See id.
292. See id. at 41 (asserting that the EPA cannot prove co-benefits exist).
293. See NAAQS Particulate Matter, supra note 147, at 3119; infra notes
399–400 and accompanying text.
294. Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 25 n.21, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (No. 14-46).
295. Opening Brief of State and Industry Petitioners, supra note 13, at 51.
296. Id. at 56.
297. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the
National Ass’n of Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Business, & the National Ass’n of Home Builders as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 22 n.15, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Nos. 14-46, 14-47,
14-49).
298. Brief of Amicus Curiae Cato Institute in Support of Petitioners at 3,
Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 18, 2016).
299. Id.
300. Opening Brief of State and Industry Petitioners, supra note 13, at 55.
301. Id. at 56.
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tain to be contemplated at all. The Agency simply “cannot quantify them [because] they are not supported by the scientific literature.”302
Benefits from particulate matter reductions are thus a key
battleground in the fight over major Obama-era Clean Air Act
rules and will almost certainly be a point of contention in future
climate change regulations. Because of the size of these benefits,
both in absolute terms and in comparison with other regulatory
effects, there is a substantial incentive for both sides to misrepresent them, and a critical need to get these estimates right. The
following section describes the robust scientific basis for the determination that particulate matter lacks a threshold below
which adverse health effects occur.
A. SCIENTIFIC BASIS
Particulate matter (PM) is a mixture of very small particles
and liquid droplets that are found in the air.303 Some particles
are large enough to be visible, such as dust, dirt, soot, and smoke,
while others are too small to be seen with the naked eye.304 Exposure to particulate matter can have negative effects on lung
and heart health, including coughing or difficulty breathing, aggravating asthma and decreased lung function, as well as heart
attacks and irregular heartbeat.305 Exposure can be deadly, particularly for people with heart or lung disease.306
The EPA regulates particulate matter under two standards,
which are based on the size of the particulate matter particles.307
Extremely small particles, those measuring 2.5 micrometers or
less, are regulated under the PM2.5 standards, while larger particles measuring between 2.5 and 10 micrometers are regulated
under the PM10 standards.308 The current standards for particulate matter set limits on PM2.5 of 35 μg/m3 averaged over 24
302. Id.
303. Particulate Matter (PM) Basics, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/particulate-matter-pm-basics#PM (last updated Sept. 10, 2018).
304. Id.
305. Health and Environmental Effects of Particulate Matter (PM), U.S.
ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/health-and
-environmental-effects-particulate-matter-pm (last updated June 20, 2018)
(listing the health effects linked to exposure to particulate matter).
306. See id.
307. See NAAQS Particulate Matter, supra note 147, at 3086 (explaining the
standards for fine particles).
308. Id.
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hours and of 12 μg/m3 averaged annually.309 The PM10 standard
is a 24-hour average of 150 μg/m3, and there is no annual standard.310
These standards do not represent the level at which there
are no health effects from particulate matter exposure.311 The
science on benefits from reductions in particulate matter below
the NAAQS, some of which is summarized in this section, is robust.312 In general, the evidence suggests there is no threshold
for particulate matter, which means that risk from particulate
matter exists at every level of exposure.313
For example, in 2006, the EPA solicited a report of judgments from experts on the concentration response relationship
between small particulate matter particles (PM2.5) and mortality.314 The twelve experts who participated in the report were
selected through a peer-nomination process and included experts in epidemiology, toxicology, and medicine.315 As part of this
study, the experts were asked about their views on the concentration-response function, which measures health effects at different levels of exposure.316 While all experts believed that individuals may exhibit thresholds for PM-related mortality, eleven
of the twelve rejected the idea of a population threshold, stating
309.
310.
311.
Effects

Id.
Id. at 3089.
See, e.g., Jonathan O. Anderson et al., Clearing the Air: A Review of the
of Particulate Matter Air Pollution on Human Health, 8 J. MED. TOXICOLOGY 166, 172 tbl.5 (2012) (showing that “[u]nusually sensitive people” can
experience adverse effects and are recommended to avoid heavy exertion even
when the particulate matter exposure is below the current standards).
312. For extensive examples of research on the benefits particulate matter
reductions below the current NAAQS, see infra notes 314–69 and accompanying
text.
313. See infra notes 314–69. It is well beyond the scope of this Article to
comprehensively review and independently evaluate all of the scientific research on the relationship between particulate matter exposure and negative
health outcomes. The research presented here thus focuses primarily on aggregated reports written by scientists, doctors, and other experts on the effects of
particulate matter on human health. In doing so, the authors defer to the expertise of these writers and their judgments in aggregating and analyzing evidence on the health effects of particulate matter.
314. See INDUS. ECON., EXPANDED EXPERT JUDGMENT ASSESSMENT OF THE
CONCENTRATION-RESPONSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PM2.5 EXPOSURE AND
MORTALITY, at i–ii (2006), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/Uncertainty/
pm_ee_report.pdf (documenting “expert judgments concerning the impact of a
one μg/m3 change in ambient, annual average PM2.5 on annual, adult, all-cause
mortality in the U.S.”).
315. See id. at ii.
316. Id. at iv.
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that there was insufficient evidence to support such a threshold.317 Seven experts noted that a population threshold was unlikely due to variations in susceptibility as a result of genetic,
environmental, and socioeconomic factors.318 The single expert
who believed it was possible to make a conceptual argument for
a population threshold noted that he did not believe such a
threshold was detectable in currently available epidemiologic
studies.319 This expert also stated that he was 50% certain a population threshold existed, and that if there were a threshold, he
thought there was an 80% chance the threshold would be less
than 5 μg/m3, and a 20% chance that it would fall between 5 and
10 μg/m3.320 Both levels cited by the expert are lower than the
current NAAQS levels for PM2.5 of 12 μg/m3.321
A 2010 scientific report from the American Heart Association reached similar conclusions.322 The authors of that report
included specialists in a wide range of disciplines: “cardiovascular and environmental epidemiology and statistics, atmospheric
sciences, cardiovascular and pulmonary medicine, basic science
research, and public policy.”323 The report comprehensively reviewed studies, published between 2004 and 2009, on the relationship between particulate matter and heart health.324 The report concluded that “there appeared to be no lower-limit
threshold below which PM10 was not associated with excess [cardiovascular] mortality.”325 With regard to PM2.5, the report
stated that there appeared to be a linear concentration-response
relationship between the small particles and mortality risk without a discernible safe threshold.326 The report suggested that an
area for future research was determining whether there is any
safe PM threshold that protects both healthy and susceptible in-

317. Id. at 3-25. For a discussion of the difference between individual and
population thresholds, see supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
318. INDUS. ECON., supra note 314, at 3-25.
319. Id. at 3-25 to -26.
320. Id. at 3-26.
321. See NAAQS Particulate Matter, supra note 147, at 3157.
322. See Robert D. Brook et al., Particulate Matter Air Pollution and Cardiovascular Disease: An Update to the Scientific Statement from the American
Heart Association, 121 CIRCULATION 2331, 2338 (2010) (finding there is an increased mortality rate for PM levels lower than the current NAAQS threshold).
323. Id. at 2332.
324. See generally id.
325. Id. at 2338.
326. Id. at 2350–51.
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dividuals, but noted that current evidence supports the conclusion that there is no safe threshold.327
The American Thoracic Society (ATS), in a 2016 article, likewise reported adverse health effects below the NAAQS.328 The
ATS recommended an annual standard for PM2.5 of 11 μg/m3,
which is lower than the current NAAQS requirements.329 The
report estimated the health impacts from PM exposure in places
that violated the ATS’s annual standard, including places in
compliance with the EPA’s requirements.330 The report found
that relative to current particulate matter levels across the country,331 an estimated 2913 deaths and 5543 instances of morbidity
would be avoided if the 11 μg/m3 were met.332 The report also
noted that “this approach does not imply that further health benefits would not be achieved by still further reductions in pollution levels,” relying in part on the EPA’s own statement that
there is no epidemiological evidence of a threshold for PM.333
The Harvard School of Public Health Six Cities Study334 and
an American Cancer Society study335 are two key studies in the
evaluation of particulate matter exposure health impacts, and
both have been extensively relied upon by the EPA in its particulate matter NAAQS rulemakings.336 Both studies include follow up research; the Six Cities Study was originally published in
327. See id. at 2365–66.
328. See Kevin R. Cromar et al., American Thoracic Society and Marron Institute Report Estimated Excess Morbidity and Mortality Caused by Air Pollution Above American Thoracic Society-Recommended Standards, 2011–2013, 13
ANNALS AM. THORACIC SOC’Y 1195, 1201 (2016) (“The ATS recommendations
for . . . PM2.5 . . . are more stringent than the current NAAQS determined by the
EPA.”).
329. Id. at 1195.
330. Id. at 1197 (finding annually approximately 6408 deaths can be attributed to pollution concentrations higher than ATS’s recommendation).
331. Note that many parts of the United States violate the current NAAQS
levels. See id. at 1197 fig.1. As such, these estimates reflect cumulative effects
of current violations of the NAAQS plus the benefits of lowering the PM2.5 from
the current 12 μg/m3 to 11 μg/m3, as recommended by the American Thoracic
Society. See id. at 1196–97.
332. Id. at 1198 fig.3.
333. Id. at 1201.
334. Douglas W. Dockery et al., An Association Between Air Pollution and
Mortality in Six U.S. Cities, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753, 1753 (1993).
335. C. Arden Pope III et al., Particulate Air Pollution as a Predictor of Mortality in a Prospective Study of U.S. Adults, 151 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL
CARE MED. 669 (1995).
336. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-12-005, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES FOR THE FINAL REVISIONS TO THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR
QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER, at 1-12 (2012) [hereinafter
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1993, with follow up research released in 2006 and again in
2012;337 the American Cancer Society Study was released in
1995 and updated in 2002 and 2004.338 These studies were cited
by the Bush Administration EPA in the 2006 particulate matter
NAAQS,339 by all experts solicited in the 2006 EPA expert solicitation,340 and were also relied upon by the Obama Administration in the 2016 particulate matter NAAQS,341 the Mercury and
Air Toxics Standards report,342 the Clean Power Plan report,343
and the Cross Border Air Pollution Rule report.344 The Bush EPA
noted that “these studies have found consistent relationships between fine particle indicators and premature mortality across

2012 PM RIA], https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-pm_ria_final_
2012-12.pdf (“Since the proposed rule, the EPA has incorporated an array of
policy and technical updates to the benefits analysis approach applied in this
RIA, including incorporation of the most recent follow-up to the Harvard Six
Cities cohort study (Lepeule et al., 2012).”); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES FOR THE REVIEW OF PARTICULATE MATTER NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS, at 5-27 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 PM
RIA], https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-pm_ria_final_2006-10.pdf
(“The most extensive analyses have been based on data from two prospective
cohort groups, often referred to as the Harvard ‘Six-Cities Study’ . . . and the
‘American Cancer Society or ACS study’ . . . .”).
337. See 2012 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-7 (citing the Six Cities Study
updates from 2006 and 2012); 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-27 (citing the
Harvard Six Cities Study history from 1993 and 2006).
338. See 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-27 (citing the American Cancer
Society study’s versions from 1995, 2002, and 2004).
339. Id. (citing the Six Cities Study and the American Cancer Society study).
340. See INDUS. ECON., supra note 314, at viii (“Experts relied upon a core
set of cohort epidemiology studies to derive their quantitative estimates, mainly
those associated with the ACS and Six Cities cohort.”).
341. 2012 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 1-12 (stating that the EPA relied on
the Six Cities Study for its report).
342. MATS RIA, supra note 21, at 5-27 (relying on the analyses from the Six
Cities Study and the American Cancer Society study).
343. CLEAN POWER PLAN RIA, supra note 22, at 4-16 to -17 (stating that the
EPA used the American Cancer Society report and the Six Cities Study to help
determine “PM-related mortality”).
344. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-16-004, REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS OF THE CROSS-STATE AIR POLLUTION RULE (CSAPR) UPDATE FOR THE
2008 NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR GROUND-LEVEL OZONE,
at 5-11 to -13 (2016) [hereinafter CSAPR RIA], https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/
docs/ria/transport_ria_final-csapr-update_2016-09.pdf (citing findings from the
Six Cities Study and the American Cancer Society study); U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FEDERAL IMPLEMENTATION
PLANS TO REDUCE INTERSTATE TRANSPORT OF FINE PARTICULATE MATTER AND
OZONE IN 27 STATES; CORRECTION OF SIP APPROVALS FOR 22 STATES, at 527 (2011), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/transport_ria_final-csapr
_2011-06.pdf (citing findings from the Six Cities Study and ACS study).
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multiple locations in the United States.”345 The EPA summarized in the Cross Border Air Pollution Rule report that the authors of the 2012 Six Cities Study follow-up “found significant
associations between PM2.5 exposure and increased risk of premature all-cause, cardiovascular and lung cancer mortality,” and
“concluded that the [concentration-response] relationship was
linear down to PM2.5 concentrations of 8 μg/m3.”346 This level is
substantially lower than 12 μg/m3, the current NAAQS annual
standard for particulate matter.347
Experts outside of the EPA have also relied on the findings
of the Six Cities Study and the American Cancer Society study
to support their determination that particulate matter is a no
threshold pollutant.348 In 2002, relying on the American Cancer
Society study, the National Research Council’s Committee on estimating the Health-Risk-Reduction Benefits of Proposed Air
Pollution Regulations349 concluded that “there is no evidence for
any . . . indication of a threshold” for particulate matter.350 Additionally, the Health Effects Subcommittee (HES) of the Advisory Council on Clean Air Compliance Analysis relied on both
the Six Cities Study and the American Cancer Society study to
conclude that it “fully supports EPA’s use of a no-threshold
model to estimate the mortality reductions associated with reduced PM exposure.”351 It reasoned that the EPA’s “decision is
345. 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-27.
346. CSAPR RIA, supra note 344, at 5-12 to -13.
347. See NAAQS Particulate Matter, supra note 147, at 3086 (stating that
the current NAAQS levels for PM2.5 is 12 μg/m3).
348. For an example of how experts have relied on these studies see infra
notes 349–54 and accompanying text.
349. In 2000, due to congressional concerns about the EPA’s method of estimating health benefits from air pollution reduction, the Senate appropriated
funds to the EPA and directed the Agency to request a study from the National
Academy of Sciences on the EPA’s methodologies. The National Academy of Science arranged for the National Research Council’s Committee on Estimating
the Heath-Risk-Reduction Benefits of Proposed Air Pollution Regulations to
prepare a report in 2002, which reviewed and critiqued the EPA’s benefit analysis. See COMM. ON ESTIMATING THE HEALTH-RISK-REDUCTION BENEFITS OF
PROPOSED AIR POLLUTION REGULATIONS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ESTIMATING THE PUBLIC HEALTH BENEFITS OF PROPOSED AIR POLLUTION REGULATIONS
1–2 (2002) [hereinafter HEALTH-RISK-REDUCTION COMMITTEE].
350. Id. at 109. The committee went on to recommend that if the EPA plans
to base its benefit analysis on the assumption that a threshold exists, which is
not proven in any scientific study, the EPA should make its assumptions and
reasoning clear. Id. at 111.
351. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY ADVISORY COUNCIL ON CLEAN AIR COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS HEALTH EFFECTS SUBCOMM., REVIEW OF EPA’S DRAFT HEALTH
BENEFITS OF THE SECOND SECTION 812 PROSPECTIVE STUDY OF THE CLEAN AIR
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supported by the data, which are quite consistent in showing effects down to the lowest measured levels.”352 Also, a 2008 followup to the Harvard Six Cities Study found that there was an 86%
probability that PM2.5 followed a linear no-threshold model.353
This report explained that “[a] key finding of this study is that
there is little evidence for a threshold in the association between
exposure to fine particles and the risk of death on follow-up.”354
Instead of reducing PM concentration by relying on “an arbitrary
standard,” such as a threshold model, the study recommended
“reduc[ing] particle concentration everywhere, at all times, to
the extent feasible and affordable.”355 Another 2012 follow-up to
the Harvard Six Cities Study provided additional data suggesting the health effects from PM exposure do not have a threshold
and follow a linear model at low doses.356
The World Health Organization (WHO), a specialized
agency of the United Nations,357 in a report cataloguing the
global impact of particulate matter pollution, noted that this pollution represents one of the world’s biggest environmental
health risks, killing around three million people annually worldwide.358 The report explains that this “pollution has health impacts even at very low concentrations—indeed no threshold has
been identified below which no damage to health is observed.”359
WHO recommends that countries set standards at the lowest
concentrations possible, and has set guideline values for PM2.5 at
ACT 2 (2010) [hereinafter REVIEW OF EPA’S DRAFT], https://yosemite.epa.gov/
sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/72D4EFA39E48CDB28525774500738776/$File/EPACOUNCIL-10-001-unsigned.pdf. Similarly to the National Research Council’s
Committee on Estimating the Heath-Risk-Reduction Benefits of Proposed Air
Pollution Regulations, see HEALTH-RISK-REDUCTION COMMITTEE, supra note
349, the HES was tasked with drafting a report in order to provide the EPA
with guidance on how it estimates benefits and uncertainties for particulate
matter and ozone. See id.
352. Id. at 13.
353. Joel Schwartz et al., The Effect of Dose and Timing of Dose on the Association Between Airborne Particles and Survival, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.
64, 67 (2008).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 68.
356. Johanna Lepeule et al., Chronic Exposure to Fine Particles and Mortality: An Extended Follow-up of the Harvard Six Cities Study from 1974 to 2009,
120 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 965, 967 (2012) (finding results “indicating a linear
relationship with PM2.5”).
357. World Health Org. [WHO] Const. pmbl. (1946).
358. WORLD HEALTH ORG., AMBIENT AIR POLLUTION: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF EXPOSURE AND BURDEN OF DISEASE 11 (2016), http://apps.who.int/iris/
bitstream/10665/250141/1/9789241511353-eng.pdf?ua=1.
359. Id. at 21.

2019]

NEXT BATTLEGROUND

1407

10 µg/m3 annual mean and 25 µg/m3 24-hour mean,360 which is
well below the current NAAQS of 12 µg/m3 annual mean and 35
µg/m3 24-hour mean.361
A recent study from the Harvard School of Public Health
confirms these findings and strengthens the evidence of health
effects from particulate matter exposure below the current
NAAQS. The 2017 study, which included a cohort of all Medicare
beneficiaries (approximately 60 million people) throughout the
United States, focused specifically on measuring health effects
below the current particulate matter and ozone NAAQS.362 The
researchers measured health effects for people residing in places
where PM2.5 concentrations ranged from 6.21 to 15.64 μg/m3.363
The study reported “a relationship between PM2.5, ozone, and allcause mortality that was almost linear, with no signal of [a]
threshold down to 5 μg[/m3]” in annual exposure.364 Moreover,
the authors found that “[t]here was a significant association between PM2.5 exposure and mortality when the analysis was restricted to concentrations below 12 μg per cubic meter [the current NAAQS], with a steeper slope below that level.”365 This
study, which contains a very large sample size representing a
geographically and socioeconomically diverse cross section of the
country,366 concludes that in the entire population studied “there
was significant evidence of adverse effects related to exposure to
PM2.5 . . . concentrations below current national standards.”367
The study “found no evidence of a threshold value—the concentration at which PM2.5 exposure does not affect mortality—at
concentrations as low as approximately 5 μg per cubic meter,”368
confirming a finding similar to those of other studies.369

360. Id.
361. See NAAQS Particulate Matter, supra note 147, at 3086 (stating the
current NAAQS).
362. See Di et al., supra note 25, at 2514 (explaining the method of the nationwide study).
363. Id. at 2515.
364. Id. at 2518.
365. Id. at 2520. A steeper slope at low levels indicates that the marginal
health risk from additional exposure at low levels is actually higher than the
marginal risk at higher levels of exposure. See id.
366. See id. at 2515 tbl.1 (providing information of the large cohort’s characteristics).
367. Id. at 2513.
368. Id. at 2520.
369. See id.

1408

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:1349

The Trump Administration has attacked the validity of
these studies in a rulemaking announced in April 2018.370 The
proposed rule on “Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory
Science” targets the use of most primary scientific literature currently available on the health impacts of particulate matter.371
Specifically, the rulemaking would prohibit the EPA from using
“data and models underlying the science” unless that data “is
publicly available in a manner sufficient for validation and analysis.”372 Though a rule requiring transparency in scientific data
may seem innocuous, in practice the regulation would severely
hamstring the EPA. Individual medical data used in scientific
studies generally cannot be made fully public,373 in order to protect the confidential medical information of study participants.374 Under this proposed rule it would no longer be permissible for the EPA to use any of these studies when performing
cost benefit analyses on particulate matter or other public health
regulations. Even the Medicare data used in the 2017 Harvard
School of Public Health study is confidential and protected from
general public access, though it may be requested by scientists
or industry to conduct their own independent analysis.375 The
370. See generally Strengthening Transparency, supra note 117 (explaining
the EPA’s proposed rule under the Trump Administration).
371. Cf. id. at 18,769 (stating that the purpose of the rule is to “[e]nhanc[e]
the transparency and validity of the scientific information relied upon by EPA”).
372. Id. There is a provision which would allow the Administrator to:
exempt significant regulatory decisions on a case-by-case basis if he or
she determines that compliance is impracticable because it is not feasible to ensure that all dose response data and models underlying pivotal regulatory science are publicly available in a fashion that is consistent with law, protects privacy and confidentiality, and is sensitive
to national and homeland security, or in instances where OMB’s Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review provides for an exemption
(Section IX).
Id. at 18,772. Of course, aggressive utilization of this provision would blunt the
effects of this regulation, but because the provision is entirely discretionary, it
is also possible that this provision would provide no relief at all from the impacts
of this proposed rule.
373. See Jennifer Lu & Abby Smith, EPA Plan to Limit Science Use May
Undercut Air, Climate Programs, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://bnanews.bna.com/environment-and-energy/epa-plan-to-limit-science
-use-may-undercut-air-climate-programs (“The studies use individual medical
data that can’t be made public, and that would be prohibited from agency use
under the EPA’s new plans.”).
374. See id. (stating researchers are required to keep private medical data
confidential).
375. See Lu & Smith, supra note 373 (stating the Harvard Six Cities Study
contains private individuals’ medical information that cannot be shared publicly).
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proposed rule, if finalized, would have the effect of dramatically
reducing estimates of the negative health effects of particulate
matter and other air pollutants. This, in turn, would lower the
estimated benefits from regulating these pollutants, and thus
could be used to justify less stringent regulations.
B. REGULATORY TREATMENT
The EPA has consistently found over three decades, and under administrations of both parties, that there are health effects
from particulate matter exposure at low levels, below the
NAAQS. The Agency has done so at different times by explicitly
stating that there is no evidence of a threshold, by calculating
benefits for reductions in particulate matter below the level of
the NAAQs, or both.
As early as 1984, the EPA under President Reagan explicitly
stated that there is no evidence of a threshold for particulate
matter.376 Specifically, the Agency’s 1984 Regulatory Impact
Analysis stated that “the data do not . . . show evidence of a clear
threshold in exposed populations. Instead they suggest a continuum of response with both the likelihood (risk) of effects occurring and the magnitude of any potential effect decreasing with
concentration.”377 This language was reiterated verbatim in the
1987 final rule.378
In 1997, the Clinton EPA determined that “the available epidemiological studies provide strong evidence suggesting that
376. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS ON THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER, at VI-15

to -17 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 PM RIA], http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL
.cgi?Dockey=9101HEPX.TXT (explaining research in a staff paper that concluded there was no evidence to show “a clear threshold”).
377. Id. at VI-15. The 1984 RIA was also the first time the EPA calculated
the economic benefits for ambient air standards, and the Agency also analyzed
benefits from particulate matter at different levels. See id. at VI-1. While the
EPA did not analyze an alternative that was equally or more stringent for both
the annual average and 24-hour standard, it did analyze an annual standard
lower than the one it ultimately selected, paired with a 24-hour limit higher
than what it chose. See id. at VI-15. In the 1987 NAAQS, the EPA selected a
PM10 annual average limit of 50 μg/m3 and a 24-hour limit of 150 μg/m3. 1987
Revisions to NAAQS, supra note 30, at 24,634. However, in its RIA, the EPA
reviewed benefits from a PM10 annual limit of 48 μg/m3 paired with a 24-hour
limit of 183 μg/m3. 1984 PM RIA, supra note 376, at VI-38 tbl.VI.G.2. While the
EPA did not conduct an analysis of benefits at the level it ultimately selected,
see id. at VI-40, making it impossible to directly compare the two options, the
EPA did find benefits at the 48 μg/m3 annual limit scenario. See id. at VI-37 to
-40.
378. 1987 Revisions to NAAQS, supra note 30, at 24,642.
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PM causes or contributes to health effects at levels below the
current standards”379 and that “the level or even existence of
population thresholds below which no effects occur cannot be reliably determined.”380 The Agency also calculated benefits for reducing particulate matter below the level it ultimately selected.381 In the 1997 NAAQS revision, the EPA set the annual
average standard for PM2.5 at 15μg/m3, and the 24-hour limit at
65 μg/m3.382 In the accompanying RIA, the EPA analyzed the
costs and benefits of the level it chose along with a more stringent standard. The more stringent standard the EPA reviewed
was an annual standard set at 15μg/m3, in combination with a
lower 24-hour standard set at 50 μg/m3.383 At the level the EPA
eventually selected for the NAAQS standard, the Agency found
annual benefits from partial attainment384 to be between $19 billion (low estimate) and $104 billion (high estimate).385 However,
the EPA found greater benefits, a high estimate of $107 billion,
under this more stringent level.386
379. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62
Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,670 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) [hereinafter 1997 PM NAAQS].
380. Id.
381. Compare id. at 38,652 (setting the 24-hour PM2.5 limit at 65 μg/m3), with
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES FOR THE PARTICULATE MATTER AND OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND
PROPOSED REGIONAL HAZE RULE, at ΕΣ−23 tbl.ES-3 (1997) [hereinafter 1997
PM RIA], https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-o3-pm_ria_proposal_
1997-07.pdf (reviewing a lower 24-hour standard for PM2.5 at 50 μg/m3).
382. 1997 PM NAAQS, supra note 379, at 38,652.
383. 1997 PM RIA, supra note 381 (comparing the annual costs and benefits
alternatives for 2010, including one at the low rate of a 15μg/m3 annual standard with a 50 μg/m3 24-hour standard).
384. The 1997 RIA refers to “partial attainment” rather than full attainment
because the analysis “does not attempt to force its models to project full attainment of the new standard in areas not predicted to achieve attainment by 2010,”
the year selected for the baseline. Id. at ΕΣ−13. Instead, the RIA attempts to
account for the probability “that counties with PM2.5 levels above the standard
will likely need more time beyond 2010; new control strategies (e.g., regional
controls or economic incentive programs); and/or new technologies in order to
attain the standard.” Id. at ΕΣ−12. Additionally, “[f ] or the PM analysis [in the
RIA], a $1 billion/μg/m3 cut-off is used to limit the adoption of control measures.
Control measures providing air quality improvements are less than $1 billion/μg/m3 are adopted where the air quality model and cost analysis identify
control measures as being necessary.” Id.
385. Id. at ΕΣ−19. These are annual gross benefits. See id. ΕΣ−14 to −15.
“There are benefits from PM control that could not be monetized in the benefits
analysis[.] . . . The effect . . . leads to an underestimation of the monetized benefits presented.” Id. at ΕΣ−19.
386. Id. at ΕΣ−23 tbl.ES-3. The RIA does not provide a low estimate of annual benefits or annual costs for the more stringent 15μg/m3 standard. See id.
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In 2006, the EPA under George W. Bush found that “effect
thresholds can neither be discerned nor determined not to exist.”387 The Agency also noted that “several new studies available
in [its] review have used different methods to examine [particulate matter concentration-response relationships], and most
have been unable to detect threshold levels in time-series mortality studies.”388 The EPA again calculated benefits at a particulate matter standard more stringent than the one it ultimately
chose for the NAAQS. The 2006 final rule established a PM2.5 24hour standard of 35 μg/m3 and retained the annual standard of
15 μg/m3.389 The RIA also included an analysis of benefits from
a more stringent annual standard of 14 μg/m3 paired with the
same 35 μg/m3 24-hour limit.390 Again, the EPA found higher
benefits for the more stringent standard.391 Using a 3% discount
rate,392 the EPA found $17 billion in benefits at the 15 μg/m3
standard, but $30 billion in benefits under the more stringent 14
μg/m3 standard.393 Again using a 3% discount rate, the EPA also
calculated benefits using a different methodology and found between $9 billion and $76 billion in benefits from the 15 μg/m3
standard, but $17 billion to $140 billion in benefits for the 14
μg/m3 standard.394
Further, the Bush EPA calculated additional health and
welfare benefits under the more stringent standard. Under multiple valuation methods, the EPA found that approximately
twice as many deaths would be avoided under the 14 μg/m3
standard compared with the 15 μg/m3 standard it ultimately selected.395 The EPA found that chronic bronchitis effects would be
at ΕΣ−14 to −23.
387. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 71
Fed. Reg. 61,144, 61,152 (Oct. 17, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
388. Id. at 61,158.
389. Id. at 61,144.
390. 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at ES-1 to -2.
391. Id. at ES-7 tbl.ES-1 (showing the estimated benefits for the more stringent standards versus the 1997 revised standards).
392. As noted above, the 3% discount rate presents a more realistic figure
for calculating the present value of benefits from reduction of future air pollution. See Newell, supra note 9.
393. 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at ES-7 tbl.ES-1 (comparing full attainment benefits with social costs through incremental attainment of the 1997
standards).
394. Id.
395. Id. at ES-8 tbl.ES-2 (estimating the reduction of adverse health and
welfare effects associated with incremental attainment of alternative standards).
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reduced by 4600 cases under a more stringent standard but by
2600 under the standard it selected.396 Hospital admissions for
respiratory events would be reduced by 980 under the stricter
level but by 530 under EPA’s standard, and hospital admissions
for cardiovascular events for people over the age of seventeen
would decrease by 2100 under the stricter level but by only 1100
under the standard selected.397
In the most recent revision of particulate matter NAAQS
under the Obama Administration, the EPA expressed its clearest rejection of thresholds for particulate matter. The Agency
noted in the Final Rule updating the NAAQS in 2013 that, because “there is no discernible population-level threshold below
which effects would not occur, . . . it is reasonable to consider
that health effects may occur over the full range of concentrations observed in the epidemiological studies, including the
lower concentrations in the latter years.”398 The EPA also explicitly addressed comments from the American Petroleum Institute
and the American Chemistry Council asserting that “there is a
threshold in the PM-health effect relationship and that the loglinear model is not biologically plausible.”399 The Agency countered that:
The EPA disagrees with this assertion due to the number of studies
evaluated in the Integrated Science Assessment that continue to support the use of a no-threshold, log-linear model to most appropriately
represent the PM concentration-response relationship. . . . [EPA’s
Clean Air Science Advisory Committee] likewise advised that
“[a]lthough there is increasing uncertainty at lower levels, there is no
evidence of a threshold.”400

As in previous administrations, the EPA again found additional
benefits from a standard more stringent than the NAAQS. The
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. NAAQS Particulate Matter, supra note 147, at 3148.
399. Id. at 3119.
400. Id. Further, when the EPA acknowledged in its Integrated Review Plan
for the 2016 PM NAAQS rulemaking that particulate matter lacks a threshold
of effects, the Clean Air Science Advisory Committee affirmed that conclusion.
See Memorandum from Dr. Ana V. Diez Roux, Chair, Clean Air Sci. Advisory
Comm., to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, CASAC Review of the
EPA’s Integrated Review Plan for the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
for Particulate Matter (External Review Draft - April 2016) (Aug. 31, 2016),
https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/9920C7E70022CCF9852580200
0702022/$File/EPA-CASAC+2016-003+unsigned.pdf (noting that “[t]he approach in the last review to setting an annual standard when there is ‘no discernible population level threshold’ for health effects is clearly explained” and
appropriate).
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2012 RIA presents the benefits for the NAAQS levels the EPA
chose, a PM2.5 24-hour standard of 35 μg/m3 and an annual average standard of 12 μg/m3.401 The Agency also calculated benefits
from an 11μg/m3 annual standard.402 At a 3% discount rate, the
EPA found between $3.7 and $9 billion in benefits for the 12
μg/m3 standard, but $11 to $29 billion in benefits at the more
stringent 11 μg/m3 level.403
C. ADDRESSING UNCERTAINTY
The preceding discussion should not be read to suggest that
there is no uncertainty about the health effects of particulate
matter at low levels of exposure. Exposure studies generally do
not examine populations exposed to ambient levels down to zero.
Rather, studies generally have a lowest measured level (LML),
which is the lowest level of exposure studied.404 The EPA is
tasked with the difficult job of extrapolating a dose-response relationship below these levels, and it has acknowledged that uncertainty remains about the shape of that relationship.405
One tactic of regulatory critics is to conflate this uncertainty
with the existence of a threshold. For example, state and industry challengers to the Clean Power Plan emphasized the EPA’s
admission that there is uncertainty about the scale of particulate
matter health effects at very low exposure levels.406 These challengers asserted that NAAQS are “‘precautionary and preventative’ in nature . . . and intended to protect the most sensitive subgroups in the population, [yet] EPA did not have confidence that
401. See 2012 PM RIA, supra note 336, at ES-2.
402. Id.
403. Id. at ES-14 to -15 tbl.ES-2 (showing total monetized benefits, costs,
and net benefits for full attainment by 2020).
404. For example, the RIA for the proposed repeal of the Clean Power Plan
states that:
[e]stimates were calculated assuming that the number of PM2.5-attributable premature deaths falls to zero at PM2.5 levels at or below the
Lowest Measured Level of each of two [long-term] epidemiological studies used to quantify PM2.5-related risk of death (Krewski et al. 2009,
LML = 5.8 μg/m3; Lepeule et al. 2012; LML = 8 μg/m3).
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE REVIEW OF THE
CLEAN POWER PLAN: PROPOSAL 10 (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2017-10/documents/ria_proposed-cpp-repeal_2017-10_0.pdf.
The EPA routinely deals with this issue for carcinogens as well. See GUIDELINES
FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 78, at 1-14, 3-16 to -17 (describing the use of the “point of departure” method).
405. GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 78, at 316 to -17.
406. Opening Brief of State and Industry Petitioners, supra note 13, at 53.
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a level below 12 μg/m3 was needed to provide the rigorous protections the Act requires.”407 The group further asserted that if
the EPA, in its 2013 NAAQS review of particulate matter, determined that the health benefits of reductions were “so uncertain
that it [was] not appropriate to include exposures below 12 μg/m3
within the ‘adequate margin of safety’ provided by the NAAQS,”
the EPA should not later be able to claim that reductions below
that same level will yield billions of dollars in benefits.408
However, over the course of several decades, the EPA has
consistently considered and incorporated uncertainty into its assessments of the NAAQS on the basis of the relevant scientific
research. In its 1997 Regulatory Impact Analysis for particulate
matter, the EPA noted that “one significant source of uncertainty is the possible existence of a threshold concentration below which no adverse health effects occur.”409 The EPA addressed this uncertainty in its benefits calculations, providing a
“high end” estimate, which assumed that health benefits from
reductions in particulate matter occur “all the way down to background levels” for certain health effects.410 The EPA also provided a “low end” estimate which assumed that health benefits
from particulate matter reductions occur “only down to the level
of the standard.”411
In 2006, the EPA acknowledged that there was a debate as
to whether a threshold exists for particulate matter,412 and addressed the uncertainty by assuming that the particulate matter
concentration-response function was linear within the concentrations “under consideration,” which the EPA defined to be
above an assumed threshold of 10 μg/m3.413 The Agency also
407. Id.
408. Id. “EPA cannot justify its decision to regulate EGU HAPs under § 112
based on asserted public health benefits it only recently concluded did not justify regulation of those non-HAPs.” Id. at 51.
409. 1997 PM RIA, supra note 381, at 12-14.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-20.
413. Id. at 5-7 (“The C-R function for fine particles is approximately linear
within the range of ambient concentrations under consideration (above the assumed threshold of 10 μg/m3). Thus, we assume that the [C-R] functions are
applicable to estimates of health benefits associated with reducing fine particles
in areas with varied concentrations of PM, including both regions that are in
attainment with PM2.5 standards and those that do not meet the standards.”).
However, the EPA also examined several alternative thresholds in a sensitivity
analysis. See id. at 5-44 (“Five cutpoints (including the base case assumption)
were included in this sensitivity analysis: (a) 14 μg/m3 (assumes no impacts be-
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noted that its Science Advisory Board, which provides advice to
the EPA on benefits analysis methods, “model[ed] premature
mortality associated with PM exposure as a non-threshold effect,
that is, with harmful effects to exposed populations regardless of
the absolute level of ambient PM concentrations.”414
By 2012, a much larger number of studies had produced evidence of the health effects of particulate matter exposure at low
levels. The EPA acknowledged that there was still uncertainty
in the 2012 RIA, but both the language used by the Agency and
the assumptions it makes reflect the growing body of evidence
that particulate matter has health effects at low levels. Specifically, the EPA stated that it was “more confident in the magnitude of the risks we [estimated] from simulated PM2.5 concentrations that coincide with the bulk of observed PM
concentrations.”415 The EPA further acknowledged that it was
“less confident in the risk we estimate from simulated PM2.5 concentrations that fall below the bulk of the observed data in these
studies.”416
The EPA likewise discussed uncertainties in developing the
Mercury and Air Toxics Standards. The EPA calculated particulate matter reduction benefits for the Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards using studies measuring health impacts below the

low the alternative annual NAAQS), (b) 12 μg/m3 (c) 10 μg/m3 (reflects comments from CASAC - 2005), (d) 7.5 μg/m3 (reflects recommendations from SABHES to consider estimating mortality benefits down to the lowest exposure levels considered in the Pope 2002 study used as the basis for modeling chronic
mortality) and (e) background or 3 μg/m3 (reflects NRC recommendation to consider effects all the way to background).”) For the more stringent 7.5 μg/m3 and
3 μg/m3 threshold cutpoints, the sensitivity analyses estimated increased benefits relative to the assumed 10 μg/m3 threshold, albeit with increasing uncertainty at lower concentrations. See id. at 5-81 to -84 (estimating greater reductions in mortality incidence and greater monetized benefits from reduced
mortality risk for lower threshold cutpoints).
The 2008 RIA for PM reiterated the Science Advisory Board’s discussion of
PM exposure as a non-threshold effect and endorsed the use of a non-threshold
model at low concentrations. See 2008 FINAL OZONE RIA, supra note 252, at 6c5 n.2 (“For the studies of long-term exposure, . . . the most careful work on this
issue . . . report[s] that the associations between PM2.5 and both all-cause and
cardiopulmonary mortality were near linear within the relevant ranges, with
no apparent threshold. Graphical analyses of these studies . . . also suggest a
continuum of effects down to lower levels. Therefore, it is reasonable for EPA to
assume a no threshold model down to, at least, the low end of the concentrations
reported in the studies.”).
414. 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-20.
415. 2012 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-81.
416. Id.
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NAAQS levels, but above the zero exposure level.417 The LML of
these studies helped inform EPA’s analysis.418 The EPA calculated the benefits at LMLs of major PM studies and found that
11% of the estimated benefits from avoided premature deaths
occur at or above an annual mean PM2.5 level of 10 μg/m3,419 and
73% of the benefits occur at or above 7.5 μg/m3.420 The EPA modeled benefits below the LML, in line with the Agency’s acknowledgement that particulate matter is not a threshold pollutant,
but noted that the Agency has lower confidence in the exact
value of those estimates.421 The EPA also noted that it addressed
uncertainties in the magnitude of effects by following the same
approach used by the Bush EPA in the 2006 particulate matter
NAAQS RIA.422
However, the fact that uncertainty remains does not mean
there is evidence to conclude that particulate matter causes no
health effects below a certain level. As the EPA noted in the 2012
RIA, “[i]t is important to emphasize that ‘less confidence’ does
not mean ‘no confidence.’ . . . [W]e still have high confidence that
PM2.5 is causally associated with risk at those lower air quality
concentrations.”423 The EPA went on to note that although it
uses benchmarks as part of its analysis, including the LML, this
does not mean that the EPA views “these concentration benchmarks as a concentration threshold below which we would not
quantify health benefits of air quality improvements.”424 In
short, the EPA has consistently acknowledged scientific uncertainty and accounts for it at various times, but this does not prevent the Agency from modeling health effects at low levels of exposure.425 And the EPA has found adverse health effects below
417. MATS RIA, supra note 21, at 5-98, 5-100.
418. See id.
419. Id. at 5-100. For the Laden et al. study, a major 2006 study and a follow
up to the Harvard Six Cities study, 10 μg/m3 was the LML. Id. (citing Francine
Laden et al., Reduction in Fine Particulate Air Pollution and Mortality: Extended Follow-up of the Harvard Six Cities Study, 173 AM. J. RESPIRATORY &
CRITICAL CARE MED. 667 (2006)).
420. MATS RIA, supra note 21, at 5-100. For the Pope et al. study of 2002,
another prominent study, 7.5 µg/m3 was the LML. Id. (citing C. Arden Pope III
et al., Lung Cancer, Cardiopulmonary Mortality, and Long-term Exposure to
Fine Particulate Air Pollution, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1132 (2002)).
421. MATS RIA, supra note 21, at 5-100.
422. Id. at 5-17.
423. 2012 PM RIA, supra note 336, at 5-81 to -82.
424. Id. at 5-82.
425. See, e.g., id. at ES-1; 2006 PM RIA, supra note 336, at ES-1; 1997 PM
RIA, supra note 381, at ΕΣ−23 tbl.ES-3; 1984 PM RIA, supra note 376, at VI-
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the NAAQS nearly every time the Agency has studied exposure
effects below those levels.426
D. ADJUSTING BASELINES
In addition to asserting that particulate matter reductions
below the NAAQS yield no health benefits, critics of regulations
also attack the methods the EPA uses to measure these effects.
Specifically, critics claim that the EPA has not adjusted the
baseline to account for prior regulation of particulate matter, effectively “double counting” particulate matter benefits.427 This
section addresses those criticisms, showing that the EPA practice has consistently accounted for emission reductions resulting
from prior regulations in setting its basis of comparison.
A baseline is the status quo that would exist without a new
regulation, and it is necessary to measure the benefits of the regulation. OMB Circular A-4 instructs agencies to “[i]dentify a
baseline” so as to “evaluate properly the benefits and costs of
regulations and their alternatives.”428 Baselines are straightforward in theory but quite complex in practice. For example, think
of a rule that has already been promulgated but is not scheduled
to go into effect immediately and will be rolled out over many
years—or consider that the earlier rule may never be fully implemented if a later administration decides to repeal it. How
should the EPA measure that earlier rule? Should the Agency
include it in the baseline for a new regulation? The EPA has developed standard methods for handling such questions to promote uniformity across regulations, which are discussed in this
section.
Opponents argue that the EPA is “double counting;” that is,
inflating a regulation’s purported benefits by failing to account
for existing regulations that will achieve the same reduction of
the pollutant. According to one critic, the Agency “regularly
flouts [a] basic principle of sound regulation by ignoring the
PM2.5 and ozone reductions it has already mandated, and counting those reductions again as benefits in new rules. The same
ton of pollutant thus serves to justify multiple rules, even though
the pollution can only be prevented once.”429 Tellingly, former
15.
426. See supra Part III.B (cataloging the EPA’s consistent finding over three
decades of adverse health effects from particulate matter below NAAQS levels).
427. See LESSER, supra note 26.
428. CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 66, at 2.
429. Gray, supra note 26.
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Trump EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt expressed a commitment
to ensuring that his Agency would not “double count” benefits
from existing regulations; he asserted that the EPA “shouldn’t
take pollutants that we regulate under our [NAAQS] program
and then count that as a benefit when we’re already achieving
that with other regulation and contribute it to . . . the Clean
Power Plan cost-benefit analysis. And [the Obama Administration] did that because the costs were so extraordinary.”430
These claims ignore the reality that the EPA has maintained clear standards designed to prevent double counting. The
EPA’s guidance on baselines states that it is the Agency’s common practice “to assume full compliance with regulatory requirements,”431 which includes newly enacted but not yet implemented regulations.432 This means that benefits from prior rules
are accounted for in the baseline—these benefits are not ignored
and then used again for a later regulation.433 The Agency specifically notes that this general rule allows the EPA to focus on incremental economic effects of the new rule “without double
counting benefits and costs captured by analyses performed for
other rules.”434
The EPA also explicitly discusses the ways in which it accounts for prior benefits achieved under the NAAQS. For the
Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, the EPA notes that its baseline accounts for “the emissions reductions of SOx, NOx, directly
emitted PM, and CO2 . . . consistent with application of federal
rules, state rules and statutes, and other binding, enforceable
commitments in place by December 2010,”435 as well as the
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) as finalized in July
2011.436 Likewise, in the Clean Power Plan, the EPA states that
it included in its baseline all state and federal air regulations
either in effect or enacted and clearly delineated at the time.437
430. Justin Worland, EPA Head Scott Pruitt Says Oil and Coal Companies
He Met with Aren’t ‘Polluters,’ TIME (Oct. 20, 2017), http://time.com/4990060/
scott-pruitt-interview-epa-schedule-meetings (showing Scott Pruitt’s interview
with TIME).
431. GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES, supra note 56, at 53.
432. Id. at 5-9.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. MATS RIA, supra note 21, at 1-11.
436. See id.
437. See CLEAN POWER PLAN RIA, supra note 22, at 1-5 (“Base Case v.5.15
includes the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), the Mercury and Air Toxics Rule (MATS), the proposed Carbon Pollution Standards for New Power
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The EPA also notes in its Base Case, which documents the
Agency’s calculations of the baseline used to measure the benefits and costs of new regulations, that the baseline includes
“NAAQS to the extent that state regulations . . . contain
measures to bring non-attainment areas into attainment.”438
The EPA further notes that “[a]part from these state regulations, individual permits issued by states in response to
[NAAQS] are only captured [to the extent they are reported to
EPA].”439 Thus, the EPA includes benefits from NAAQS requirements to the extent they are implemented by states. Such treatment makes sense in light of the regulatory structure created by
the Clean Air Act. Under the Act, the EPA sets the NAAQS,
which are a national standard for allowable air pollution levels.
However, the NAAQS are implemented by the states through
State Implementation Plans (SIPs). States have a great deal of
discretion in determining how to work toward achieving the
NAAQS. As a result of this structure, when the EPA promulgates the NAAQS and attempts to estimate the costs and benefits of these standards, the Agency must make a number of assumptions about how states will ultimately choose to regulate
pollution. The SIPs provide a much clearer picture of the actual
costs and benefits of the NAAQS. Further, it is the SIPs, and not
the NAAQS, which are actually enforceable. The EPA used the
SIPs as its baseline for the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards
and the Clean Power Plan, which were promulgated to bring areas into attainment with the NAAQS.
Plants, the Cooling Water Intakes (316(b)) Rule, the Combustion Residuals
from Electric Utilities (CCR), and other state and Federal regulations to the
extent that they contain measures, permits, or other air-related limitations or
requirements.”).
438. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA BASE CASE V.5.14 USING IPM: INCREMENTAL DOCUMENTATION 1 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2015-08/documents/epa_base_case_v514_incremental_documentation.pdf. The
Base Case in place when the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards rule was promulgated in 2011 similarly included “ozone and particulate matter standards to
the extent that some of the state regulations . . . contain measures to bring nonattainment areas into attainment.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DOCUMENTATION FOR EPA BASE CASE V.4.10 USING THE INTEGRATED PLANNING MODEL, at
1-1 (2010) [hereinafter BASE CASE 4.10], https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/
P100CF8G.PDF?Dockey=P100CF8G.PDF.
439. BASE CASE 4.10, supra note 438 (regarding which permits are included,
the EPA specifically notes that “to the extent that they are reflected in the NOx
rates reported to EPA under [CSAPR], Title IV and the NOx Budget Program
which are incorporated in the base case and . . . to the extent that SO2 permit
limits are used in the base case to define the choice of coal sulfur grades that
are available to specific power plants”).
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The EPA likewise accounts for rules that have the co-benefit
of reducing NAAQS pollutants in its baseline for future NAAQS.
Particulate matter is regulated directly under the NAAQS but is
also affected indirectly by rules like the Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards and the Clean Power Plan that directly target other
pollutants. In a subsequent update of the NAAQS for particulate
matter, the EPA stated that it included the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards in that baseline as well, noting that “[e]mission
reductions achieved under rules that require specific actions
from sources—such as [Mercury and Air Toxics Standards]—are
in the baseline of this NAAQS analysis, as are emission reductions needed to meet the current NAAQS.”440
In its draft repeal of the Clean Power Plan, the Trump Administration also raises the issue of baselines. However, the
Agency takes a different approach than other critics of these regulations. Rather than arguing that the EPA’s 2015 Regulatory
Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan double counts particulate matter benefits, the proposed rule points out that particulate matter could be regulated in other ways. This is, of course,
the case; particulate matter is regulated directly under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. From this fact, the
Trump EPA presents the following hypothetical:
“[H]ad those SO2 and NOx [particulate matter] reductions been
achieved through other means, then they would have been represented
in the baseline for this proposed repeal (as well as for the 2015 Final
[Clean Power Plan]), which would have affected the estimated costs
and benefits of controlling CO2 emissions alone.”441

The Agency then presents calculations of the forgone benefits of
repealing the Clean Power Plan, with all of the SO2 and NOX
benefits removed.442 The logic seems to be that because these
benefits could be achieved through other regulations, the Agency
need not calculate the benefits of reducing the pollution through
this regulation; rather, it can just assume the benefits have already been achieved through another regulation. Of course, such
a regulation does not exist. The EPA cannot wish away benefits
by pretending we live in a world where the benefits have already
been achieved, and courts tasked with overseeing the EPA
should not stand idly by while the Agency attempts to do so. Not
only does the Trump Administration’s approach deviate from the

440. 2012 PM RIA, supra note 336, at ES-18.
441. Clean Power Plan Proposed Repeal, supra note 8, at 48,044 n.24.
442. Id. at 48,044–45.
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EPA’s longstanding methodology for determining baselines, but
its benefits calculations also depart from reality.
IV. CONSIDERING CO-BENEFITS
Particulate matter reductions are often co-benefits, or ancillary benefits, from rules targeting other types of pollution.443 For
example, the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards directly limit
mercury emissions from power plants but would likewise have
the effect of reducing particulate matter emissions. Similarly,
the Clean Power Plan directly regulates carbon dioxide emissions from power plants because these well-known greenhouse
gases contribute to global climate change.444 However, because
the rule requires energy generators to internalize the cost of
emissions, thus raising the cost of polluting, the rule would likely
cause a shift in sources of energy production away from sources
that produce large quantities of greenhouses gases, notably coal,
to cleaner forms of energy. This shift would additionally have the
effect of reducing particulate matter because coal-fired power
plants are also significant sources of particulate pollution.
Critics of regulations argue that cost-benefit analyses for
specific pollutants should not include co-benefits from reductions
in non-targeted pollutants. They contend that only direct and
quantifiable benefits resulting from the reduction of the specific
pollutant at issue should be included in a rule’s calculus. In their
view, the consideration of co-benefits extends beyond the scope
of the problems Congress intended to address, and instead is a
“sleight of hand” to “circumvent the[] statutory limitations on
[the EPA’s] authority.”445 According to regulation opponents,
“[p]ermitting EPA to use such illusory and statutorily irrelevant
co-benefits to justify the Rule would . . . amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.”446
443. Of course, for the NAAQS regulating particulate matter, benefits from
PM reduction are the target benefits.
444. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2013–THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 467 (Thomas F. Stocker et al. eds., 2014); NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, CLIMATE STABILIZATION TARGETS: EMISSIONS, CONCENTRATIONS,
AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA 3–4 (2011); Climate Change Science: Causes of Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://
19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climate-change-science/causes-climate
-change_.html (last updated Dec. 27, 2016).
445. Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
supra note 294, at 4.
446. Brief of 166 State and Local Business Ass’ns as Amici Curiae in Support
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This theme arose prominently in the litigation leading to
Michigan v. EPA, where co-benefits were attacked as a means of
impermissibly enabl[ing the EPA] to expand its authority to conduct additional PM2.5 regulation without following the proper
procedures of imposing such restrictions upon the country.447
Critics argued that the Agency “routinely takes credit for reductions of PM2.5 caused by rules that address harms from other
pollutants” as a “power grab” in order to regulate “outside the
specific [statutory] authority under which they are acting”448 and
to obligate further PM2.5 reductions beyond those required under
other Clean Air Act programs.449 Mercury, the pollutant directly
regulated by the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, was deemed
“a Trojan horse used to justify regulation under Section 112,
when EPA’s real focus was particulate-matter emissions by
power plants, which the agency has targeted across numerous
rulemakings in recent years.”450 Because they are not targeted
by the section of the statute upon which the rule is based, critics
argue that including co-benefits circumvents the Clean Air Act
by additionally reducing pollutants that are directly regulated
by other sections of the Act,451 so as to “indirectly require further
reductions in PM2.5 emissions from power plants that EPA
would be unable to require directly.”452 At oral argument in the
Michigan case, Chief Justice John Roberts suggested that indirect benefits merely served as “an end run” around statutory restrictions.453 Chief Justice Roberts also noted that he believed it
was a “good thing if your regulation also benefits in other ways.
of Petitioners at 26, West Virginia v. EPA, Nos. 15-1363 et al. (D.C. Cir. Feb.
23, 2016).
447. Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of the Chamber
of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 1–4, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Nos. 14-46, 14-47,
14-49).
448. Id. at 16–17.
449. Id. at 23.
450. Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
supra note 294, at 22.
451. See Opening Brief of State and Industry Petitioners, supra note 13, at
47.
452. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the
National Ass’n of Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Bus.,
and the National Ass’n of Home Builders as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 297, at 16.
453. See Opening Brief of State and Industry Petitioners, supra note 13, at
47 (internal citations omitted) (noting that at oral argument in Michigan, Chief
Justice Roberts described relying on co-benefits as “an end run” around § 109’s
restrictions and as an issue that “raises the red flag”).
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But when it’s such a disproportion, you begin to wonder whether
it’s an illegitimate way of avoiding the different—quite different
limitations on EPA that apply in the criteria program.”454
Opponents contend that even if a rule yields co-benefits,
those effects are essentially “irrelevant”455 or mere “regulatory
externalities”456 that should play no part in a cost-benefit analysis. Critics of co-benefits have called their use a “well-worn accounting trick”457 and “a controversial and legally dubious accounting method.”458 Petitioners in Michigan v. EPA argued that
“ancillary co-benefits from lower PM2.5 emissions are not relevant
benefits for the purpose of deciding whether it is appropriate to
regulate [hazardous air pollutant] emissions from electric utilities. Congress required EPA to determine whether reducing
emissions of hazardous air pollutants (not PM2.5) is ‘appropriate.’”459 Put differently:
Even if Congress intended that EPA may consider co-benefits—a concept found nowhere in the statute—in setting technology-based standards, Congress certainly did not dictate that the purported co-benefits
may force regulation of [hazardous air pollutants] under Section
112(n)(1)(A) where the reductions of the [hazardous air pollutants]
themselves provide no relative benefits in comparison to the substantial costs of regulation.460

Others have called co-benefits “inflated”461 and “unlawful[,] . . . obscur[ing] the impact of the rule on the targeted pollutant (CO2) and creates deliberate confusion regarding the Rule’s
costs and benefits.”462
454. Clean Power Plan Proposed Repeal, supra note 8, at 48,044 n.23 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts at oral argument in Michigan v. EPA).
455. Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
supra note 294, at 3; Opening Brief of State and Industry Petitioners, supra
note 13, at 49.
456. Brief of Amicus Curiae Cato Institute in Support of Petitioners, supra
note 298, at 4.
457. Brief of 166 State and Local Business Associations as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, supra note 446.
458. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the
National Ass’n of Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Business, and the National Ass’n of Home Builders as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 297, at 3.
459. Brief for Petitioners State of Michigan, et al. at 48, Michigan v. EPA,
135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 14-49) (emphasis in original).
460. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, the
National Ass’n of Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Business, and the National Ass’n of Home Builders as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 297, at 22.
461. Gray, supra note 26.
462. Brief of 166 State and Local Business Ass’ns as Amici Curiae in Support
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In the case of the Clean Power Plan, critics argue that
“[w]ithout the artificial consideration of these purported co-benefits, the Rule’s benefits would be seen for what they are: vastly
exceeded by its costs.”463 The Trump EPA echoed this claim
when, in announcing the repeal of the Clean Power Plan, it decried co-benefits as “essentially hiding” the plan’s true cost.464
The Trump Administration EPA also described the Obama Administration’s inclusion of co-benefits in the Plan as an area of
“controversy and/or uncertainty,”465 suggesting that the incorporation of these benefits is outside common EPA practice.
The arguments against considering co-benefits ring hollow,
however, when looked at in context. The EPA has consistently
and over multiple presidential administrations considered both
co-benefits and their mirror image, indirect costs, in evaluating
the consequences of regulation. Removing co-benefits would
mean systematically considering a narrower range of benefits
than costs, because it would leave intact the EPA’s current practice of measuring indirect costs while ignoring co-benefits.466
Were this not the case, critics would potentially have a valid
point. Were it true that the EPA only considers indirect effects
that are benefits, then the EPA arguably would be inflating benefits, as critics accuse.467 However, because the EPA does consider both indirect costs and benefits, what critics really want is
to put a thumb on the scale against regulation by forcing the
EPA to ignore some indirect effects while embracing others. This
Part examines the well-established use of co-benefits in cost-benefit analyses by presidential administrations, the EPA, and the
courts, as well as their endorsement in the academic literature.
A. CO-BENEFITS AND INDIRECT COSTS
The question of how to measure indirect costs and benefits
arises in the context of cost-benefit analyses. Federal agencies
have been required to perform these analyses since 1981, when
President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291.468 Previous
of Petitioners, supra note 446, at 27.
463. Id.
464. See EPA Takes Another Step to Advance President Trump’s America
First Strategy, supra note 64.
465. See id.
466. For a more detailed discussion of co-benefits as the “mirror image” of
indirect costs, see Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 4.
467. See Gray, supra note 26.
468. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,193–94 (Feb. 19, 1981).
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presidents had required some assessment of the impacts of proposed regulatory actions,469 but the Reagan Administration was
the first to formalize this requirement.470 The EPA’s early costbenefit analyses focused only on the direct costs and benefits of
regulations.471 However, substantial academic, administrative,
and judicial attention turned to the consideration of countervailing risks in the 1990s with the publication of Risk Versus Risk
by John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener.472 The book
outlined the leading framework for considering indirect costs,
also known as countervailing risks: risk-risk analysis.473 The
guiding principal of risk-risk analysis, as conceived by Graham
and Wiener, is that regulations intended to minimize or eliminate certain health or environmental risks can have the perverse
effect of promoting other risks, and thus a more comprehensive
and accurate accounting of regulatory effects would consider
these countervailing risks.474
469. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661, 12,662–63 (Mar.
24, 1978) (requiring agencies to consider “the direct and indirect effects of the
regulation” and report a “Regulatory Analysis” that contains “an analysis of the
economic consequences of . . . [regulatory] alternatives”). See generally Richard
H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 11, 13 (1995) (tracing the President’s control over the regulatory state
to “Theodore Roosevelt’s creation, in 1903, of a commission designed to study
the scientific work done by government agencies” and the “Nixon Administration’s system of ‘Quality of Life’ reviews” in which “agencies were required to
submit significant rules to [the] OMB in advance of publication in the Federal
Register”).
470. Exec. Order No. 12,291 was later revoked and replaced by President
Clinton under Executive Order 12,866, which remains in effect today. See Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). President Obama reinforced the continued viability of this order and expanded it modestly under Executive Order 13,563, which moderately increased the scope of cost-benefit analyses to permit consideration of “values that are difficult or impossible to
quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts.”
Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
471. See, e.g., Exec. Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,194 (only requiring
agencies to provide a “description of the potential benefits [and costs] of the
rule”).
472. RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
473. Graham and Wiener coined the term “risk tradeoff analysis.” John D.
Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS
RISK, supra note 472, at 1, 4.
474. RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 472, at 270. For example, Graham examines Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, a Department of
Transportation regulation intended to improve automobile fuel standards and
reduce attendant environmental and health harms, as potentially promoting
countervailing risks in the economic, energy, and national security sectors. John
D. Graham, Saving Gasoline and Lives, in RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 472,
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Risk-risk analysis picked up traction among academics specializing in administrative law. In addition to Graham and Wiener, Professor Cass Sunstein, a prominent administrative law
scholar and the head of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) under President Obama, advocated at that time
for broad application of risk-risk analysis.475 W. Kip Viscusi, a
prominent economist and leading proponent of cost-benefit analysis, also endorsed risk tradeoff analysis in the regulatory process.476
Judges at this time began to embrace risk-risk analysis as
well. Justice Breyer, concurring in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, agreed with the Court’s unanimous ruling that the
Clean Air Act prohibits the consideration of costs in setting the
NAAQS but wrote separately to argue that the “statute . . . permits the Administrator to take account of comparative health
risks.”477 Judge Stephen Williams of the D.C. Circuit was also a
notable proponent of risk-risk analysis. For example, in a concurrence in International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
& Agricultural Implement Workers v. OSHA, Judge Williams
used risk-risk analysis to challenge what he viewed as the “casual assumption that more stringent regulation will always save
lives.”478 He argued that the health-wealth connection479 required consideration of negative economic effects of regulation

at 87–103. In a separate article, Wiener discusses how risk-risk analysis reveals
a “bewildering array of countervailing risks that face efforts to prevent global
warming.” Jonathan Baert Wiener, Protecting the Global Environment, in RISK
VERSUS RISK, supra note 472, at 193–225.
475. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1533, 1537 (1996); see also Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 4, at 1764–65.
476. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1423, 1455 (1996) (arguing that “regulatory agencies should be concerned with
this broader effect [ancillary costs] of regulatory policy since their mandate is
to improve the health and welfare of citizens generally”); see also Rascoff &
Revesz, supra note 4, at 1792.
477. 531 U.S. 457, 495 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring). The D.C. Circuit opinion in that case examined a different countervailing risk: less protection from
harmful ultraviolet radiation as a result of reducing ozone pollution. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1036–37 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
478. 938 F.2d 1310, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J., concurring).
479. There is much evidence to suggest that the “health-wealth” effect,
which asserts that less wealth causes worse health outcomes, is fallacious. For
a detailed discussion of this criticism, see RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A.
LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 67–76 (2008), which questions the “health-wealth” effect and offers alternative explanations for both
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and their purported effect on health: “More regulation means
some combination of reduced value of firms, higher product
prices, fewer jobs in the regulated industry, and lower cash
wages. All the latter three stretch workers’ budgets tighter. . . .
And larger incomes enable people to lead safer lives.”480
The growing focus on examining the broader range of regulatory effects ultimately led to Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-4, which was promulgated when John D. Graham
served as Administrator of OIRA.481 OIRA, which resides with
the Office of management and Budget, is responsible for overseeing regulatory efforts of administrative agencies and has the
power to issue guidance which they must follow.482 Circular A-4
guides federal agencies in the cost-benefit regulatory analyses
required under Executive Order 12,866,483 “standardizing the
way benefits and costs of Federal regulatory actions are measured and reported.”484 As part of this standardization, Circular
A-4 explicitly requires the consideration of countervailing risks,
enshrining the analysis of the type of risks Graham and Weiner
identified.485 However, Circular A-4 goes a step further by likewise requiring consideration of ancillary benefits.486 The Circular instructs agencies to “look beyond the direct benefits and direct costs” to “consider any important ancillary benefits and
countervailing risks.”487 Further, it states that “[t]he same
standards of information and analysis quality that apply to direct benefits and costs should be applied to ancillary benefits and
countervailing risks.”488
B. THE EPA’S PRACTICE
The EPA has long acknowledged the relevance of co-benefits, and specifically has done so for regulations promulgated under the Clean Air Act. First, the EPA’s current guidelines for

health and wealth—notably, education—as well as the potential for reverse causation (i.e., that worse health causes lower wealth).
480. 938 F.2d at 1326.
481. CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 66, at 1.
482. See The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–21 (1980)
(establishing the Federal Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)).
483. CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 66, at 1.
484. Id.
485. See RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 472.
486. CIRCULAR A-4: REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 66, at 26.
487. Id.
488. Id.
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cost-benefit analyses, which were adopted in 2010 after extensive peer review, instruct the Agency to assess “all identifiable
costs and benefits,”489 and state that an economic analysis of regulations should include both “directly intended effects . . . as well
as ancillary (or co-) benefits and costs.”490 The aim of these analyses is to “inform decision making” and allow meaningful comparisons between policy alternatives.491
These guidelines build on principles applied in previous administrations. For example, the George W. Bush EPA used similar language in its 2008 draft “Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses,” declaring that “[a]n economic analysis of
regulatory or policy options should present all identifiable costs
and benefits that are incremental to the regulation or policy under consideration. These should include directly intended effects
and associated costs, as well as ancillary (or co-) benefits and
costs.”492 The proposed George W. Bush guidelines also stated
that “[f]or a regulation that is expected to have substantial indirect effects beyond the regulated sector, it is important to choose
a model that can capture those effects.”493
Likewise, the Clinton EPA’s guidelines for conducting costbenefit analyses endorsed the importance of considering indirect
costs and benefits.494 Issued in 2000, the Clinton guidelines included indirect costs as a component of its calculations for health
and social costs.495 Emphasizing that “[a] complete benefits analysis is also useful because it makes explicit the assumptions
about the value of benefits embedded in different policy
choices,”496 the guidelines determined that indirect benefits are
cognizable, focusing on indirect ecological benefits.497 Moreover,
489. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC
ANALYSES, at 11-2 (2010) [hereinafter OBAMA EPA GUIDELINES], https://www
.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-08/documents/ee-0568-50.pdf.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 7-1.
492. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC
ANALYSES (EXTERNAL REVIEW DRAFT), at 10-4 (2008) (on file with author).
493. Id. at 8-17.
494. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC
ANALYSES 67, 70, 81 (2000), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-09/
documents/ee-0228c-07.pdf.
495. Id. at 82–83, 94, 114–15.
496. Id. at 59.
497. Id. at 70 (noting that “[e]cosystem services that do not directly provide
some good or opportunity to individuals may be valued because they support
off-site ecological resources or maintain the biological and biochemical processes
required for life support”).
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the guidelines noted that “immediately following a net benefit
calculation, there should be a presentation and evaluation of all
benefits and costs that can only be quantified but not valued, as
well as all benefits and costs that can be only qualitatively described.”498 The implication is that, even for effects that cannot
be monetized, informed decision-making requires consideration
of all benefits and costs, not just direct ones. In short, all three
iterations of guidelines authored by the EPA—the 2000 guidelines, the 2008 draft guidelines, and the 2010 guidelines—called
for the use of co-benefits in cost-benefit analyses.
The EPA’s cost-benefit analyses for clean air rules have also
long included co-benefits.499 The EPA began acknowledging
these benefits in Clear Air Act rules all the way back in the
1980s. In 1985, the EPA under President Ronald Reagan conducted an extensive analysis of co-benefits from reductions of
non-target pollutants in its landmark 1985 regulation reducing
lead in gasoline, including an analysis of benefits from reductions in ozone, nitrogen oxides, and hydrocarbons.500 As part of
this analysis, the EPA found monetized co-benefits from reducing hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxides, and carbon monoxide, benzene, and other non-targeted pollutants to be worth an estimated
$222 million over just a one-year period.501 The Reagan-era EPA
also proposed developing New Source Performance Standards
for municipal waste combustors.502 As part of this proposal, the
EPA discussed the importance of considering “indirect benefits”
from its regulation of toxic emissions from municipal waste combustors.503 The EPA explained that it would include “indirect

498. Id. at 177.
499. The Senate Report accompanying the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments
indicated that the EPA could take co-benefits into account when setting standards for hazardous air pollutants. S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 172 (1989) (“When
establishing technology-based standards under this subsection, the Administrator may consider the benefits which result from the control of air pollutants that
are not listed but the emissions of which are, nevertheless, reduced by control
technologies or practices necessary to meet the prescribed limitation.”).
500. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-230-05-85-006, COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF REDUCING LEAD IN GASOLINE: FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, at VI1 to -74 (1985), https://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwan/ee-0034-1.pdf/
%24file/ee-0034-1.pdf.
501. Id. at E-8.
502. See Assessment of Municipal Waste Combustor Emissions Under the
Clean Air Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,399 (July 7, 1987) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
503. Id. at 25,406.
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benefits accruing from concomitant reductions in other regulated pollutants.”504
Under President George H.W. Bush, the EPA in 1991 justified performance standards in a proposed rule for landfill gases
in part on “the ancillary benefit of reducing global loadings of
methane.”505 Further, the EPA examined countervailing climate
change risks. The Agency noted that carbon dioxide emissions
under the proposed standard would increase, but justified regulation in part because of the climate change benefits from methane emission reductions.506 The EPA took into consideration
both the ancillary benefits of methane reductions in reducing
greenhouse gas pollution as well as the countervailing risk of increasing carbon dioxide emissions.507 The EPA’s judgment on
how to regulate was guided by the full scope of effects.
The EPA under President Bill Clinton in a 1998 rule establishing standards for hazardous air pollutant emissions from
pulp and paper producers analyzed indirect effects, both co-benefits from reductions in emissions and indirect costs from increases in emissions, for NAAQS criteria pollutants.508 Though
hazardous air pollutants were directly targeted by the rule, the
EPA nonetheless analyzed the effects of its regulation on other
air pollutants, including the criteria pollutants.509 For the “Best
Available Technology” standards which govern existing
plants,510 the EPA estimated small increases in emissions of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur dioxides from the rule,
but a significant decrease in particulate matter.511 For the New
Source Performance Standards, which govern new sources of
emissions, the EPA concluded that in addition to decreasing hazardous air pollutants, the rule would also decrease many criteria
pollutant emissions including particulate matter.512 Rather than
504. Id.
505. Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Guidelines
for Control of Existing Sources: Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 56 Fed. Reg.
24,468, 24,469 (May 30, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 60).
506. Id. at 24,472.
507. Id.
508. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Source Category: Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines,
Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper,
and Paperboard Category, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504, 18,504, 18,576 (Apr. 15, 1998)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 63, 261, and 430).
509. Id. at 18,576–77.
510. See id. at 18,508.
511. Id. at 18,576.
512. Id. at 18,579.
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ignoring some or all of these effects because they did not derive
from the target pollutants, the EPA estimated these effects and
analyzed them as part of its rule-making process.
In 2005, the EPA under George W. Bush noted that its Clean
Air Interstate Rule, which targeted particulate matter and ozone
emissions, would also reduce mercury emissions,513 and included
the benefits from mercury reductions in its cost-benefit analysis
for the rule.514 The Bush EPA also discussed co-benefits as part
of a regulation governing hazardous air pollutants from mobile
sources (primarily cars).515 The Agency noted that though the
rule dealt with control of air toxics and not criteria pollutants
including particulate matter and ozone, “this co-benefit . . . is
significant.”516 The EPA calculated that the standards would reduce exhaust emissions of direct particulate matter by over
19,000 tons in 2030 nationwide.517 The Agency also analyzed the
effects of the rule on ozone emissions, concluding that overall
ozone emissions reductions would be small, but some areas
would have “non-negligible improvements in projected eighthour ozone.”518 The EPA further noted that it viewed “these improvements as useful in meeting the eight-hour ozone
NAAQS.”519
In sum, the EPA has consistently examined a full range of
effects from regulations. Rather than arbitrarily ignoring certain
effects because they are ancillary or indirect, the EPA discusses
and analyzes indirect costs and co-benefits. The Agency has done
so through multiple presidential administrations of different
parties, and in a wide range of clean air regulations. These practices have been standard since the Reagan Administration. Two
of its OIRA administrators, Christopher DeMuth and Judge
Douglas Ginsburg, noted that: “the EPA and other agencies frequently include ancillary benefits in their benefits estimates.”520
513. Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and
Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule); Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions
to the NOX SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162, 25,170 (May 12, 2005) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, and 96).
514. Id. at 25,312.
515. Control of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Mobile Sources, 72 Fed. Reg.
8428, 8430, 8461 (Feb. 26, 2007) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 59, 80, 85, and 86).
516. Id. at 8461.
517. Id. at 8453.
518. Id. at 8458.
519. Id.
520. Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regulation, 108 MICH. L. REV. 877, 887 (2010) (reviewing REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 479).
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They also observed that “OIRA itself recommends that agencies
account for ancillary benefits as well as countervailing risks.”521
Similarly, high-profile Obama-era EPA regulations like the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards and the Clean Power Plan reflect
the requirement of OMB Circular A-4 that the Agency consider
co-benefits, and the requirement of the EPA’s own guidelines to
consider “all identifiable costs and benefits.”522 The inclusion of
co-benefits in these regulations is well in line with the longstanding practice of the EPA to include co-benefits and countervailing
risks in its assessment of clean air regulations.
C. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION
Courts are often asked to review the adequacy of an agency’s
cost-benefit analysis, and in this context they have addressed the
issue of indirect benefits and costs.523 Reviewing courts have frequently required agencies to include ancillary impacts.524 This
Section first discusses judicial decisions requiring the consideration of indirect risks, and then turns to the nascent case law on
co-benefits.
In 1991, the Fifth Circuit rejected the EPA’s attempt to ban
asbestos-based brakes under the Toxic Substances Control
Act.525 A central part of the court’s holding was its finding that
the EPA needed to consider the indirect safety effects of other
potential, non-asbestos options for car breaks.526 The court determined that under the Toxic Substances Control Act, the EPA
“was required to consider both alternatives to a ban and the costs
of any proposed actions and to ‘carry out [the Act] in a reasonable
and prudent manner [after considering] the environmental, economic, and social impact of any action.’”527 The court noted with
disapproval that the Agency had not evaluated the harm from
increased use of substitute products.528 Because the EPA did not

521. Id.
522. OBAMA EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 489.
523. See generally Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 41 (collecting and analyzing
cases where courts reviewed agencies’ cost-benefit analyses).
524. See, e.g., Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 956 F.2d 321, 323–25 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,
947 F.2d 1201, 1229–30 (5th Cir. 1991).
525. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1229–30.
526. Id. at 1225.
527. Id. at 1215 (quoting Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601(c)
(1988)).
528. Id. at 1220–21.
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account for “the dangers posed by the substitutes, including cancer deaths from the other fibers used and highway deaths occasioned by less effective, non-asbestos brakes,” the Agency’s “failure to examine the likely consequence of the EPA’s regulation
render[ed] the ban of asbestos friction products unreasonable.”529 In short, the EPA’s cost-benefit analysis did not, in the
court’s view, adequately address indirect costs and was therefore
unsupported by “substantial evidence” as required under the
statute.530
A year later the D.C. Circuit also struck down a regulation,
this time promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), for failing to consider indirect costs.531
NHTSA had attempted to increase fuel efficiency standards for
cars.532 The Agency failed to consider the potential increased
safety risks because smaller, more fuel efficient cars might be
less protective in a crash.533 The court admonished the Agency
and required NHTSA to “reconsider the matter and provide a
genuine explanation for whatever choice it ultimately makes.”534
Without calculating these indirect costs, the court found that the
Agency had not met the requirement of reasoned decision-making.535
Other circuit court decisions have likewise addressed the issue of indirect costs and have rejected cost-benefit analyses that
lacked an estimate of these effects. In 1993, the Seventh Circuit
partially vacated an OSHA regulation putting standards in place
to limit the transmission of communicable diseases.536 The
Agency failed to consider the indirect health effects that might
result if the rule increased health care costs and thus limited

529. Id. at 1224.
530. Id. at 1207.
531. Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 956
F.2d 321, 323–25 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
532. Id. at 322–23.
533. Id. at 326–27.
534. Id. at 327.
535. Id. (“When the government regulates in a way that prices many of its
citizens out of access to large-car safety, it owes them reasonable candor. If it
provides that, the affected citizens at least know that the government has faced
up to the meaning of its choice. The requirement of reasoned decision-making
ensures this result and prevents officials from cowering behind bureaucratic
mumbo-jumbo. Accordingly, we order NHTSA to reconsider the matter and provide a genuine explanation for whatever choice it ultimately makes.”).
536. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 823–27, 830–31 (7th Cir.
1993).
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access to care.537 OSHA’s “consideration of the indirect costs of
the rule is thus incomplete.”538 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit also
rebuffed an EPA regulation revising the NAAQS for ozone and
particulate matter in 1999 because in the court’s view, the
Agency failed to consider the potential health detriments from
lowering pollution.539 Specifically, the EPA failed to consider
whether “ground-level (tropospheric) ozone—the subject of th[e]
rule—has [an ultraviolet radiation]-screening function independent of the ozone higher in the atmosphere”540 with indirect
health benefits, such as reducing incidences of cataracts and
skin cancers.541 The court asserted that by ignoring these consequences, the EPA looked only at “half of a substance’s health effects.”542 As a result, the Agency’s interpretation of Title VI of
the Clean Air Act543 failed under the reasonableness standard
laid out in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, Inc.544 In 2002, the D.C. Circuit also overturned two
Federal Communications Commission rules for the Agency’s failure to consider the rules’ indirect costs545 in contravention of the
language and objectives of the Telecommunication Act.546
537. Id. at 826 (“OSHA also exaggerated the number of lives likely to be
saved by the rule by ignoring lives likely to be sacrificed by it, since the increased cost of medical care, to the extent passed on to consumers, will reduce
the demand for medical care, and some people may lose their lives as a result.”).
538. Id. (citing a comparison to Competitive Enter. Inst., 956 F.2d 321).
539. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1036–37 (D.C. Cir.
1999), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531
U.S. 457 (2001).
540. Id. at 1052.
541. Id. at 1051.
542. Id. at 1052.
543. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671–7671q (2012).
544. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1052 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
545. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 424–25 (D.C. Cir. 2002). One
rule required incumbent local exchange carriers to lease “unbundled network
elements” to competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs), while the other rule
unbundled the spectrum of local copper loops such that the CLECs would be
positioned to offer competitive internet access. Id. at 417. However, the court
found that the Commission “loftily abstracted away all specific markets” and
did not take into account indirect cost differentials in different competitive markets. Id. at 423. Moreover, the Agency “completely failed to consider the relevance of competition in broadband services coming from cable” and satellite
companies, another crucial indirect cost. Id. at 428.
546. Id. at 427–29 (noting that the FCC “must ‘apply some limiting standard, rationally related to the goals of the Act,’ . . . [and] ‘cannot, consistent with
the statute, blind itself to the availability of elements outside the incumbent’s
network.’” (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388–89
(1999))).
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Futhermore, the D.C. Circuit has explicitly addressed the
“mirror image” of indirect costs: co-benefits.547 In 2016, the
court’s decision in United States Sugar Corp. v. EPA upheld the
EPA’s consideration of co-benefits in regulating the effects of reducing hazardous air pollutants from boilers, process heaters,
and incinerators.548 Specifically, the EPA decided not to adopt
more lenient hydrogen chloride emission standards, reasoning
that it could weigh additional factors such as the “cumulative
adverse health effects due to concurrent exposure to other [hazardous air pollutants] or emissions from other nearby sources”
and the “potential impacts of increased emissions on ecosystems.”549 Industry challengers argued that the EPA’s consideration of these co-benefits in its decision to maintain the more
stringent emissions standard rendered the Agency’s decision arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure
Act.550 The EPA asserted that “its consideration of these co-benefits was not a regulation of other pollutants; rather, it was
simply choosing not to ignore the purpose of the [Clean Air
Act]—to reduce the negative health and environmental effects of
[hazardous air pollutant] emissions—when exercising its discretionary authority under the Act.”551 The D.C. Circuit held that
the EPA acted within its legal authority when it considered not
only the direct benefits of reducing hydrogen chloride, but also
the co-benefits from that reduction—namely, indirect reductions
of other hazardous air pollutants.552 The court agreed that the
use of co-benefits conforms with the Clean Air Act’s purpose,
finding that “[t]he EPA was . . . free to consider potential co-benefits that might be achieved” from enforcing the more stringent
standard.553
Courts that have examined cost-benefit analyses have
acknowledged the logic of evaluating the indirect effects of regulations and using this information to guide the rule-making process. While there have been more cases concerning indirect costs,
modern cases have addressed indirect benefits as well and no
court has said there is any reason to treat them differently.
Courts are correct to do so; these terms are merely descriptors
547. See Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 4, at 1793 (noting that indirect costs
and indirect benefits “are simply mirror images of each other”).
548. 830 F.3d 579, 591, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
549. Id. at 624.
550. Id. at 625.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 624–25.
553. Id. at 625.
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that helpfully depict whether effects are positive or negative and
they provide no justification for focusing on some effects while
ignoring others.554 Further, as DeMuth and Ginsburg note,
“[t]here appear to be no legal, political, or intellectual . . . impediments to treating ancillary benefits and countervailing risks
equally in cost-benefit analysis and regulatory design.”555 It
would therefore be incoherent to consider the negative indirect
effects of regulations without also considering the positive indirect effects.
CONCLUSION
Considering co-benefits from reductions in particulate matter and other criteria pollutants below the NAAQS is clearly supported by science and long-standing EPA precedent. It is also
necessary in order to give the public an accurate understanding
of the effects of regulation and deregulation. Critics of regulation
seek to paint benefits below the NAAQS as illusory and suggest
their inclusion in rules targeting other pollutants is overreach
by an overzealous regulator. In this Article, we have shown that
this narrative rings hollow. Through multiple presidential administrations, the EPA has calculated benefits from criteria pollutant reductions below the NAAQS, following established science. The health and mortality reduction benefits are also
exceptionally well documented for particulate matter reductions,
and account for the bulk of the criteria pollutant benefits in the
Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, Clean Power Plan, and likely
in any future regulation of greenhouse gases. The EPA has consistently acknowledged there is no evidence supporting a threshold for particulate matter over the past thirty years and has calculated benefits from reductions below particulate matter
NAAQS levels for two decades. The science on these benefits
clearly indicates that no threshold can be identified and shows
that reducing this pollution at levels well below the current
NAAQS will yield dramatic health benefits.
The Trump Administration has embraced an anti-regulatory stance in its efforts to repeal the Clean Power Plan. The Administration, and other regulation opponents, suggest that their
approach is a logical way to account for effects, arguing that including these benefits artificially inflates the positive effects of
554. See Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 4, at 1793 (“Risk tradeoffs and ancillary benefits are simply mirror images of each other. There is no justification
for privileging the former and ignoring the latter.”).
555. DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 520, at 888.
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regulating. But what they advocate is a dishonest attempt to obscure the actual effects of regulations from the public.
Ideological differences about the appropriate role for government to play in the control of pollution are a natural part of democratic debate. But public participation is a key attribute of a
vibrant democracy, and such participation is meaningful only if
the public is given accurate information about the effects of different proposals. Hiding these substantial benefits obscures the
real-world effects of deregulation. We encourage policy makers
and the courts that oversee them to embrace well-accepted science and economics, and to require transparent and accurate accounting of the benefits of air pollution regulations.

